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THE SECOND REFORMATION: FLORIDA'S MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAW
F. TOWNSEND HAWKES *
"As to diseases, make a habit of two things-to help, or at least
to do no harm."1
Hippocrates
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 30, 1985, the Florida Legislature passed the Compre-
hensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 19852 and ended a dec-
ade of stalemate between warring factions in the medical malprac-
tice arena. The Act synthesizes a vast array of prior bills, current
judicial trends, industry interests, and political concerns. The Act
effects major changes in the area of medical risk prevention, and
effects somewhat less significant changes in the areas of medical
claims resolution and medical malpractice insurance.
The legislature debated and revised the medical malpractice re-
form bill into the final hours of the 1985 Regular Session. Last
minute maneuverings arose while the bill was in Conference Com-
mittee,3 which faced the unenviable task of trying to meld the
House version of the malpractice bill, House Bill 1352, with the
vastly different Senate version, Committee Substitute for Senate
Bill 1232." The final legislation, however, is largely the culmination
*Staff Attorney, Florida House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Medical Malprac-
tice. Harvard College, A.B., 1972; Queen Mary College, University of London, M.A., 1975;
Cornell University, J.D., 1980.
1. REISER, DYCK & CURRAN, ETHICS IN MEDICINE 7 (1977).
2. Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws
1180.
3. The Conference Committee consisted of Reps. Tom Gustafson, Dem., Ft. Lauderdale;
Fred Lippman, Dem., Hollywood; Chris Meffert, Dem., Ocala; Art Simon, Dem., Miami; Jim
Watt, Repub., North Palm Beach; and Tom Woodruff, Repub., Clearwater; FLA H.R. Joun.
732, 733 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1985); Sens. Mattox Hair, Dem., Jacksonville; Dempsey Barron,
Dem., Panama City; Bill Grant, Dem., Tallahassee; Richard Langley, Repub., Clermont;
William Myers, Repub., Jupiter; and Peter Weinstein, Dem., Margate; FLA. S. JOUR. 587, 588
(Reg. Sess. May 28, 1985). Reps. Gustafson and Simon were the chief negotiators on behalf
of the House and Sen. Hair was the chief negotiator on behalf of the Senate.
4. Fla. CS for SB 1232 (1985), a 16-page bill with 15 sections, followed Fla. HB 1352
(1985), a 101-page bill with 55 sections, in only 5 areas, all of which were noncontroversial.
These identical sections appear in ch. 85-175, § 21, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1211 (informed
consent); id. § 22, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1211 (group insurance policies); id. § 43, 1985 Fla. Laws
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of months of changes and redrafts of the original House subcom-
mittee bill, PCB HC 85-2. 5 Still, two key provisions of the original
proposal, the imposition of vicarious liability on hospitals for their
staff doctors' negligence and the caps for medical malpractice pre-
miums based on doctors' incomes, were deleted by the compromise
legislation.
This Article analyzes the major provisions in the Act concerning
risk prevention, claims resolution, and malpractice insurance. The
Article reviews many of the sources relied upon by the drafters of
the legislation, examines the anticipated legal and practical effects
of the Act's provisions, and identifies some of the difficulties or
ambiguities inherent in the Act's major provisions. Finally, an
analysis is made of the essential omitted provisions, tracing their
history, purpose, and potential for later enactment by the
legislature.
at 1225 (repeal of prevailing party's attorney's fees); and id. § 47, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1229
(severability).
The content of ch. 85-175, § 6, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1187, dealing with malpractice insurance
contracts, was essentially the same in both its Senate and House forms, although the Senate
bill deleted reference to an insured's duty to cooperate in the pre-suit screening process.
Compare Fla. HB 1352, sec. 6 (1985) with Fla. CS for SB 1232, sec. 13 (1985). The House
version of sec. 6 was adopted because the pre-suit screening process was retained in the Act.
5. Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2 (1985) was first released on April 4, 1985. After incorporation
of some 100 amendments by the House Subcomm. on Med. Mal., Prop. Cas. Ins. & Litiga-
tion, the House Comm. on Health Care & Ins. made 20 more changes before adopting PCB
HC 85-2 on April 29, 1985. The Committee's bill was introduced as HB 1352 and referred to
the House Comm. on Fin. & Tax., and the Comm. on Approp. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 242 (Reg.
Sess. May 2, 1985). In the Comm. on Fin. & Tax., the provision concerning a special risk
category for high-risk doctors in the Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Asso-
ciation was amended to change the way deficits were funded. The House Comm. on Approp.
made only a few minor changes before sending the bill to the calendar. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 280
(Reg. Sess. May 7, 1985). After over 30 amendments, HB 1352 was passed by the House.
FLA. H.R. JOUR. 445, 446 (Reg. Sess. May 20, 1985). The Senate initially rejected HB 1352,
substituting its own version. FLA. S. JOUR. 546 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1985). The resulting Con-
ference Committee version, however, was based almost entirely on HB 1352. Compare Fla.
HB 1352 (First Engrossed) with Fla. CS for SB 1232 (1985). Both the House and Senate
adopted the Conference Report. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1123 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985); FLA. S.
JoUR. 1000 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985). The Governor signed the bill on June 17, 1985. Ch.
85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1229. The Act is generally effective on October 1, 1985. See
generalty ch. 85-175, §§ 48, 55, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1229, 1229.
6. Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2 was created by the House Subcomm. on Med. Mal., which was
chaired by Rep. Art Simon, and which consisted of Reps. Charles Canady, Dem., Lakeland;
Mary Figg, Dem., Temple Terrace; Tom Gustafson; Dennis Jones, Repub., Seminole; Hamil-
ton Upchurch, Dem., St. Augustine; and Tom Woodruff. Rep. Gustafson was chairman of
the principal Comm. on Health Care and Ins. and also was a member of the Subcomm. on
Med. Mal. Rep. Art Simon was primarily responsible for overseeing the generation and vi-
cissitudes of PCB HC 85-2. Rep. Gustafson was ultimately responsible to the Speaker of the
House for the vitality and philosophy of the bill.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
II. MEDICAL RISK PREVENTION
Without doubt, the most progressive aspects of the Malpractice
Reform Act emphasize preventing medical injuries. Many provi-
sions of the Act are unique in the country and represent original
approaches to a comprehensive attack on the occurrence of medi-
cal injuries.
The Malpractice Reform Act recognizes that the most intelligent
approach to the entire malpractice malaise is simply to reduce the
risk of medical injury whenever possible. Consequently, the Act
necessarily assumes that current law does not do enough in the
area of risk prevention, and that both hospitals and doctors can
improve their performance in this area.7
A. Hospital Monitoring of Medical Staff
Section 23 of the Act requires health care facilities to actively
screen and review the competence of their medical staff. Facilities,
including hospitals, must periodically review medical staff as well
as supervise the performance of staff.$ Additional requirements to
monitor medical staff are imposed in section 8, which requires each
hospital's medical review committee to screen, evaluate, and review
medical staff competence.9 Section 3 of the Act requires the gov-
erning board to discipline staff members when sufficient grounds
exist.10
7. Not everyone agrees that risk prevention can be a significant contributor to avoiding
the malpractice problem. The Florida Medical Association argues that bad doctors do not
contribute to the medical malpractice problem. FLA. MED. ASS'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABLrrY
CRisis REPORT, Tab H (1984) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care & Ins.). Note
that the Act includes a "Whereas" clause finding that monitoring of physician quality can
prevent injuries due to malpractice. See ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1183. These
"Whereas" clauses were added by the Conference Committee at the Senate's request to bol-
ster the constitutionality of the Act. They were never part of either the House or Senate
bills which formed the bases of the Act. Compare ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1183 with
Fla. CS for SB 1232 (1985) and Fla. HB 1352 (1985).
8. Ch. 85-175, § 23, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1211 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.60(1)(a)-(c)).
9. Id. § 8, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1189 (amending FL. STAT. § 768.40(2) (1983)).
10. Id. § 3 1985 Fla. Laws at 1184 (amending FLA. STAT. § 395.0115(1) (1983)). The hos-
pital board must take some disciplinary action against a staff doctor who has settled one or
more cases exceeding $10 thousand that "involve" negligent conduct. Id.
Over two years before passage of the Act, a recommendation was made to extend the
hospital's duty to discipline staff physicians when grounds exist. FLA. MED. MAL. INS. ADvi-
SORY CouNcL REP. 19-20 (Jan. 1983) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care & Ins.)
[hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COUNCIL REP.]; See also THE Gov.'s TASK FORCE ON MED.
MAL., TOWARD PREVENTION AND EARLY RESOLUTION 5-6 (Apr. 1985) (recommending that hos-
pitals be required to investigate conduct which would occasion good cause for action against
1985]
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The source of these duties to monitor is the developing national
case law. A growing number of state courts have held that hospi-
tals must assess their physicians' quality and determine their med-
ical competence before granting or renewing staff privileges.1" One
of the most influential of these decisions is Elam v. College Park
Hospital,2 in which the court held that, under the doctrine of cor-
porate liability, a hospital has a duty to protect patients from med-
ical staff negligence: "[Flor, as a general principle, a hospital's fail-
ure to insure the competence of its medical staff through careful
selection and review creates an unreasonable risk of harm to its
patients."1 3 The court in Elam recognized that a hospital environ-
ment could not be fairly segmented into the facility and the medi-
cal doctors, but that the medical care provided in a hospital was a
cooperative and mutual effort between the hospital and its medical
staff. 4
The provisions in the Act imposing on hospitals a duty to moni-
tor were relatively unchanged during the legislative process. How-
a physician's staff privileges) [hereinafter cited as Gov.'s TASK FORCE REP.].
The original recommendation of the Medical Malpractice Insurance Advisory Council was
included in Fla. CS for HB 522 (1984), introduced by Reps. Bell, Dem., Daytona Beach, and
Upchurch. The House Comm. on Jud'y made a committee substitute for the bill which died
on the calendar. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1984 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS at 175, Fla. CS for HB 522. However, CS for HB 522 provided the foundation
for the initial sections of Fla. HB 1352 (1985), which explains much of the inconsistency in
section order and logic in HB 1352. See also THE FLA. TASK FORCE ON MED. MALPRAC-
TICE-SOUTH FLA. HEALTH ACTION COALITION, INC., RESPONSIBILITY IN HEALTH CARE: RESOLU-
TION OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS IN FLORIDA (Mar. 1985), which contained many of
the provisions of CS for HB 522 (1984) and which was another source used in drafting HB
1352.
11. See generally Peters & Peraino, Malpractice in Hospitals: Ten Theories for Direct
Liability, 12 LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 254 (1984); Note, Wisconsin Hospital Held to
Owe a Duty to Its Patients to Select Qualified Physicians, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 139, 143 n.20
(1981) (more than one-quarter of the states have adopted the doctrine of hospital corporate
negligence in regard to staff selection or supervision).
12. 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (as modified).
13. Id. at 161; see also Loveridge & Kimball, Hospital Corporate Negligence Comes to
California: Questions in the Wake of Elam v. College Park Hospital, 14 PAC. L.J. 803
(1983).
14. Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164. Indeed, hospitals have found it increasingly necessary to
use model regulations to develop a workable, interrelated organization. The main source of
private regulations is the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), which
has promulgated procedural standards for hospitals to follow in screening, reviewing, and
dismissing medical staff. Current Florida law requires a hospital to use JCAH standards,
among others, for these actions. See FLA. STAT. § 395.0115 (1983); see also Holly v. Auld, 450
So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984) (discovery privileges for peer review committees broadly interpreted);
Carida v. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc., 427 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (standards of pleading
for wrongful dismissal of staff member); Comment, The Medical Staff Privileges Problem in
Florida, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 339 (1984).
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ever, specific duties to manage risk comprehensively were added to
section 23 when an important, original part of this section, impos-
ing vicarious liability on hospitals for staff doctors' negligence, was
deleted. 15 The vicarious liability provision was withdrawn by the
bill's prime sponsors on the House floor in response to concerted
opposition by hospitals and their lobby groups to the provision. In
its place, increased duties to comprehensively manage risks and to
enforce risk management procedures were imposed on hospitals. 6
Additionally, a new section was added to section 23 allowing hospi-
tals to purchase "umbrella" insurance policies covering their staff
doctors. "
The Act imposes a duty on hospitals which has not been pre-
cisely defined by judicial decision in this state. Although nationally
there is a growing minority trend toward imposing corporate liabil-
ity on hospitals, holding them to a duty of due care for patients'
welfare by preventing staff incompetence, Florida courts have yet
to impose such a duty.'"
Under the Act, a hospital may be directly liable both for failure
to screen new physicians and for failure to continually monitor ex-
isting staff.'9 Thus, if a hospital knows or should have known that
a member of its staff is practicing medicine below a reasonably ac-
ceptable standard, the hospital must act to remedy the situation or
risk exposure for negligent failure to monitor its staff.2 0 Further,
since periodic review of medical staff is required, failure to dili-
15. The vicarious liability provision in the original proposed bill read: "All health care
facilities, including hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers, as defined in Chapter 395, are
liable for the negligent acts or omissions of their medical staff and personnel, committed
within the scope of the health care facilities' business." Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 21
(draft of Apr. 4, 1985) (words underlined are additions).
16. FLA. H.R. Joux 393 (Reg. Sess. May 16, 1985) (Substitute Amendment 5); interview
with Rep. Tom Gustafson (Sept. 23, 1985).
17. Ch. 85-175, § 23, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1211 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.60(2)).
Another section of the bill, sec. 22, already allowed group medical malpractice policies, so
the addition of the umbrella provision is redundant. The purpose of "umbrella" coverage is
to reduce insurance costs by consolidating hospital and doctor insureds under a single, com-
prehensive policy. A concomitant benefit is "channeling," which occurs when malpractice
claims are asserted against a single entity, typically the hospital, regardless of the entity's
fault. See infra notes 202-11 and accompanying text.
18. See Comment, supra note 14, at 341 n.14; Note, Hospital Corporate Liability: An
Effective Solution to Controlling Physician Incompetence?, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 342 (1979);
Lisko, Hospital Liability Under Theories of Respondeat Superior and Corporate Negli-
gence, 47 UMKC L. REv. 171 (1978).
19. Ch. 85-175, § 23, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1211 (to be codified at FL. STAT. §
768.60(1)(a)-(c)).
20. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care & Ins., HB 1352 (1985) Staff Analysis 23
(final June 4, 1985) (on file with committee).
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gently conduct such review to discover a problem physician would
also expose the hospital to liability.21 Finally, the Act requires the
hospital to supervise staff and medical treatment to ensure compli-
ance with standards established in a comprehensive risk manage-
ment program.22
The point of this duty to monitor is to provide a hospital with
the incentive to control the quality of medical care delivered by its
staff.2" Since the vast majority of malpractice occurs in hospitals,
the hospital is in the optimum position to prevent the greatest
amount of malpractice.2 ' By imposing responsibility on the hospi-
tals, early detection of problem physicians is encouraged.25
The effectiveness of the Act's monitoring provisions depends
largely upon the goodwill of individual hospitals in carrying out
the Act's intent. A hospital that can ill-afford to remove a highly
productive physician from its staff may not do so because the eco-
nomic consequences are difficult to accept.26 Further, even though
21. Florida is not alone in statutorily imposing on hospitals the duty to ensure the com-
petence of medical staff. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1-6.5 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1985); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21513 (West 1980).
22. Ch. 85-175, § 23, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1211 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.60(1)(a)-(c)). A claim based on breach of the hospital's duty to monitor staff through
selection and review suffers serious proof problems. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying
text. Therefore, this additional duty to supervise medical treatment to fulfill risk manage-
ment obligations could be critical. Cf. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp.,
211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (hospital must supervise medi-
cal treatment provided by physicians). The duty to supervise recognizes the superior, con-
trolling position of the hospital, similar to an employer or partner, and foreshadows liability
based on principles of respondeat superior.
23. References to legislative intent not included in the Act or events that occurred dur-
ing meetings of the Conference Committee are based upon the author's experience as the
attorney for the House Subcomm. on Med. Mal., as the primary draftsman for Fla. HB
1352, from discussions that occurred at meetings of the Subcomm. and the House Comm. on
Health Care & Ins. regarding HB 1352 (recorded and on file with the Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Health Care & Ins.), and from conversations with Rep. Tom Gustafson, Chairman, Comm.
on Health Care & Ins., as well as with other members of the Committee.
24. Between 75% and 80% of all malpractice arises in hospitals. See Note, Hospital
Corporate Liability, supra note 18, at 376; FLA. COMM'R OF INS., REPORT TO THE FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA 8 (Feb. 1983)
(on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care & Ins.) [hereinafter cited as FLA. INS. COMM'R
REP.].
25. The Florida League of Hospitals (FLH) has taken the position that only a minimum
amount of malpractice is avoidable by increased hospital monitoring. Based on insurance
credits of 10% for active risk management programs, the FLH projected the 10% amount as
a possible maximum savings. FLA. LEAGUE OF HOSPITALS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PCB 85-2,
SECTION 21 POSITrIoN PAPER at 1-2 (May 8, 1985) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health
Care & Ins.) [hereinafter cited as FLA. LEAGUE OF HOSPITALS POSITION PAPER].
26. Ironically, an excess supply of physicians in Florida may have the practical economic
effect of encouraging hospitals to dismiss marginal physicians who may easily be replaced by
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the Act provides increased protection for hospitals from reprisal
suits brought by rejected, dismissed or disciplined physicians, a
hospital must still afford physicians elaborate due process proce-
dures before it can act in relative confidence.27
Various sections of the Act deal extensively with the problem of
reprisal suits. The Act attempts to extend immunity to the entire
peer review process to the greatest extent allowable within due
process limitations. Sections 2, 3, and 8 grant broad immunity to
those involved in the peer review process, except for actions taken
with intentional fraud.28 Additionally, these sections impose unilat-
eral attorney's fees on the physician bringing a reprisal suit, and
require the physician to post a bond to cover potential fees.29 Fi-
nally, the investigative proceedings and records of a hospital
board, associated with denying and reviewing privileges, are pro-
tected from discovery, as currently provided for medical review
committees. 30
These protections were given to hospital and peer review com-
mittees to encourage the diligent monitoring of medical staff with-
out fear of reprisal suits.31 Unless individual hospitals are moti-
more capable physicians available in the newly competitive market place. See generally
Gov.'s TASK FORCE REP., supra note 10, at 22, 31-32.
27. See generally Comment, supra note 14.
28. Ch. 85-175, § 2, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1183 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
395.011(8)(a)-(b)); id. § 3, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1184 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
395.0115(5)(a)-(b)); id. § 8, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1189 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.40(6)(a)-(b)). This imposition of liability for "intentional fraud" only recognizes that
Florida law is somewhat unusual in allowing an action for negligent misrepresentation, re-
quiring no actual intent or knowledge for fraud. See Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts, Inc., 608
F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979); Outlaw v. McMichael, 397 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); 27 FLA.
JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 47 (1981 & Supp. 1985). The Act attempts to implement maxi-
mum constitutional protection for those involved in the peer review process, drawing the
line at intentional and willful acts. Note, however, that the immunity is only from "mone-
tary" liability; a physician may bring suit for injunctive relief against a hospital which failed
to follow its bylaws or afford due process in a rejection or dismissal proceeding. The availa-
bility of a suit for injunctive relief was recognized in Carida v. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc., 427
So. 2d 803, 806 n.6 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Several states have similar provisions. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.7 (West Supp. 1985).
29. Ch. 85-175, § 2, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1183 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
395.011(8)(a)-(b)); id. § 3, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1184 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
395.0115(5)(a)-(b)); id. § 8, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1189 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.40(6)(a)-(b)).
30. See FLA. STAT. § 768.40 (1983). These increased immunity provisions originated in
the 1983 ADvISoRY COUNCIL REP., supra note 10, at 17-18, were included in Fla. CS for HB
522, sec. 5 (1984), and were recommended in the Gov.'s TASK FORCE REP., supra note 10, at
5.
31. An ancillary benefit of statutorily requiring hospitals to screen and review medical
staff is the increased protection from antitrust suits afforded by raising the peer review
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vated to raise the quality of medical practice, one cannot expect
significant progress in the prevention of malpractice.
A final problem with imposing on the hospital a duty to monitor
staff is that the same protection from discovery granted to en-
courage participation in the peer review process essentially fore-
stalls a patient who attempts to prove a hospital's negligence in
fulfilling the new statutory obligations. At the heart of such an ac-
tion, a patient must prove notice by the hospital of problems or
reasonably anticipated problems with its staff doctor. Without
proof outside the protected peer review process, a patient's action
for negligent failure to monitor staff would appear doomed. 2 Sec-
tions 2, 3, and 8 of the Act prohibit discovery or admission of in-
vestigations, proceedings, and records of the hospital board and re-
view committee that concern the peer review process. Therefore, a
patient must rely on evidence detailing previous dismissals from
other hospitals, inadequate training, other malpractice claims,
state disciplinary actions, or records of other victims of the same
defendant.3" Further, the medical records of other patients, which
could reveal a pattern of malpractice and notice to the hospital,
are initially protected from discovery and afforded confidential sta-
tus under current law.3 4 One commentator has suggested a solution
to this predicament: allow discovery of records of other patients
treated by a defendant doctor, with patients' names and identify-
process to the level of "state action" protected under the Parker doctrine. See Marrese v.
Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984) (hospitals' peer review action protected by
Parker doctrine since review required by state law and state actively supervised peer review
process).
32. See Note, Corporate Negligence Actions Against Hospitals-Can The Plaintiff
Prove A Case?, 59 WASH. L. REv. 913 (1984). If unrelated to the plaintiff's case, prior actions
by a medical review committee against a defendant doctor would theoretically be discovera-
ble. Thus, only a peer review action arising from a plaintiff's case would be protected by
statute from discovery. See Segal v. Roberts, 380 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert.
denied, 388 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1980). Ironically, these prior review actions may nevertheless
be protected from discovery by public policy. Courts may allow discovery "only in the most
necessitous circumstances." 380 So. 2d at 1052.
33. See Note, supra note 32, at 924.
34. FLA. STAT. § 395.017 (1983). As this statute seems to protect the negligent doctor and
the hospital that should have known of the doctor's prior negligence as much as it protects
patient confidentiality, one wonders whether patient confidentiality was the sole purpose of
the statute. Note, however, that a plaintiff may seek discovery of patient records by sub-
poena, id. § 395.017(3)(d), and that a previous requirement of "good cause" was deleted
from the statute in 1983, ch. 83-108, § 2, 1983 Fla. Laws 358, 359 (amending FLA. STAT. §
395.017(3) (Supp. 1982)). Nevertheless, since other patient records are "privileged and confi-
dential," plaintiffs would still have the onus of overcoming the protected status by some
reasonable showing of necessity.
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ing materials expunged.-5 Unless a realistic means of proof is given
to patients who claim against a hospital for negligent failure to
monitor staff physicians, the incentive for risk management reform
remains ephemeral.
B. Hospital Risk Management
Hospitals are required under the Act to adopt and enforce a
comprehensive risk management program. s The program must be
supervised by a certified risk manager.3 7 The Act provides for a
complete certification program for these risk managers. s Further,
hospitals are required to periodically report in detail to the De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) all medical
incidents, and promptly to report severe medical incidents. HRS
may issue mandatory risk management requirements to reporting
facilities.39
The certification requirements for risk managers were patterned
directly after the existing statute for nursing home administrators'
licensure, with appropriate modifications recommended by the
Florida Society for Hospital Risk Management.40 The medical inci-
dent reporting requirements were based on HRS
recommendations. 41
Hospitals have been required to implement risk management
programs since 1975.2 This law, however, has not proven entirely
satisfactory. Hospitals were only required to "designate" a risk
manager who need merely meet the hospital board's own require-
ments." Although an incident reporting system was also required,
35. See Note, supra note 32, at 925-26.
36. Ch. 85-175, § 23, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1211 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.60(1)(b)).
37. Id. § 9, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1191 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1983), to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 395.041(2)).
38. Id. § 38, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1219 (to be codified at FLA- STAT. §§ 626.991-.995).
39. Id. § 9, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1191 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1983), to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 395.041).
40. See supra note 23. The certification program was originally included in PCB HC 85-
2 as a licensure program under the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR). Fla. H.R.
PCB HC 85-2, sec. 37 (draft of Apr. 4, 1985). It was later moved to the Department of
Insurance (DOI) at the latter's verbal request. See supra note 23. Because smaller hospitals
objected to the cost of a complete licensure program, the program as finally enacted was a
simplified, less costly certification process. The nursing home administrators are licensed
under FLA. STAT. §§ 468.1635-.1775 (1983).
41. See Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care & Ins., HB 1352 (1985) Staff Analysis
10 (final June 4, 1985) (on file with committee).
42. Ch. 75-9, § 3, 1975 Fla. Laws 16 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1983)).
43. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 1OD-75.02(12) (1983).
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no direct state agency supervision or management of medical inci-
dents was in effect."' Indeed, the entire risk management program
statute lacks meaningful preventive devices.46
The Act requires health care facilities to hire a risk manager cer-
tified by the Department of Insurance (DOI).4e The purpose of the
certification program is to create a specialized profession of risk
managers.47 The Act also provides for an advisory council of risk
managers who will assist in further development of risk manager
qualifications and model risk management programs. Basic certifi-
cation requirements focus on minimum education or experience in
risk management. 48
The certified risk manager is the hospital employee accountable
for implementation of the risk management program required
under section 9 of the Act. An essential part of the program is
medical incident reporting to HRS.49 Section 9 requires, for the
first time, detailed medical incident reports which include the
names of physicians involved in each medical incident. The reports
must also describe all medical claims filed against the facility and
disciplinary actions taken against staff by the facility. An immedi-
ate report of severe medical injuries is also required. In response,
HRS may prescribe mandatory measures to be taken by the facil-
ity and report physicians with disciplinary problems to the Depart-
ment of Professional Regulation (DPR).50 Since these provisions
come within HRS's jurisdiction, HRS can use its full panoply of
health care facility licensure powers and penalties to enforce facil-
ity compliance.51
Risk management requirements similar to those imposed on hos-
pitals are now imposed on health maintenance organizations
44. FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1983).
45. Fortunately, several hospitals have voluntarily implemented comprehensive model
risk management programs. For example, Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami, under the
direction of Roberta Carroll, has adopted an exemplary program. See R. Carroll, Policy and
Procedures of Mt. Sinai Medical Center (unpublished manual) (on file with Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Health Care & Ins.).
46. Ch. 85-175 § 9, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1191 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1983), to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 395.041(2)).
47. See supra note 23.
48. Ch. 85-175, § 38, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1219 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 626.994(1)-
(2)).
49. Id. § 9, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1191 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1983), to be codified
at FLA. STAT. § 395.041).
50. Id.
51. For example, the continued failure to meet adequate risk management standards or
a continued experience of avoidable medical incidents could allow HRS under FLA. STAT. §
395.003(7) (1983) to suspend or cancel the hospital's license.
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(HMOs) by section 46.52 The HMO must hire certified risk manag-
ers only if it is large and maintains a health care facility.5 3 The
purpose of the medical incident reporting requirements is to pro-
vide statewide data to detect trends of malpractice through consol-
idation of information.5 4 Once the state agency recognizes recur-
rent or avoidable problems, appropriate corrective actions should
be taken either by adjusting individual hospital procedure or issu-
ing statewide information bulletins.55 A central difficulty encoun-
tered in the risk management area is the lack of discernible and
specific risk management standards which can be uniformly re-
quired by law. Hence, the certification of risk managers and re-
porting of medical incidents to HRS represent initial, pragmatic
steps in developing comprehensive risk management programs.
DOI will develop model risk management programs that may, in
the future, be statutorily mandated.
Another difficulty with medical incident reporting lies in defin-
ing an "adverse or untoward" incident. The term is pointedly left
without definition. 6 HRS, however, is accorded specific rulemak-
52. Ch. 85-175, § 46, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1226 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 641.391). A
health maintenance organization (HMO) is an organization certified by DOI under FLA.
STAT. ch. 641, part II (1983) and which employs or contracts with health care providers to
render comprehensive health care, usually including preventive care, to persons enrolled in
the organization's prepaid plan. An HMO plan typically does not charge the enrollee a de-
ductible or require coinsurance.
53. Ch. 85-175, § 46, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1226 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
641.391(2)). Certain HMO facilities provide no health care treatment but merely refer pa-
tients to appropriate providers. When an HMO facility merely refers patients for treatment,
the necessity for a risk manager seems questionable. The HMO was previously required to
manage its risk under the ineffective FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1983). The hospital risk manage-
ment and reporting requirements were moved to FLA. STAT. ch. 395 to provide HRS with
significant licensure enforcement powers against hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers.
HMO risk management requirements, originally deleted in Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, were
added to the Act upon the recommendation of DOI. See ch. 85-175, § 46, 1985 Fla. Laws
1180, 1226 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 641.391). HRS was given supervision of the HMO
risk management programs but lacks appropriate enforcement powers under FLA. STAT. ch.
641. It would seem necessary that DOI, as the ultimate certifying authority for the HMO, be
given the supervisory capacity for HMO risk management.
54. See supra note 23.
55. The data gathered by HRS is neither discoverable nor admissible, except for pur-
poses of disciplinary actions by the appropriate state agency. Ch. 85-175, § 9, 1985 Fla. Laws
1180, 1191 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 395.041(5)(a)(6), (6)-(7)). Without such protection,
it is doubtful that diligent and candid reporting of all adverse medical incidents could be
achieved. Note, however, that individual incident reports are apparently still discoverable
but not admissible under FLA. STAT. § 395.041(4).
56. Coincidentally, the term "untoward, adverse medical incident" as used in § 9 of the
Act was also used to describe compensable medical injuries under the "Medical Adversity
Compensation Law," proposed by Sen. Barron along the lines of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Law. See Fla. CS for SB 1022, sec. 1 (1984).
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ing power under this section,5 7 and one would anticipate an evolv-
ing definition based on agency experience. Because the facility's
risk manager generally determines what constitutes an "adverse or
untoward" medical incident, again the success of the provision de-
pends largely on the good faith assessment and reporting of the
risk manager.
C. Insurance Reporting Requirements
Although current law requires insurers annually to report closed
medical malpractice claims to DOI, the Act significantly increases
the informational requirements in these claim reports.5 8 More im-
portantly, for the first time the public will have access to the infor-
mation contained in these closed claim reports.5 9
The source of the increased reporting requirements was a stan-
dardized reporting form used by the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners, entitled "NAIC Medical Professional Liabil-
ity Insurance Uniform Claims Report."60 Section 7 of the Act
requires reporting the names of all defendants, the name of the
facility involved, a detailed description of the injury and misdiag-
nosis, and risk management steps taken by the insured to avoid
similar injuries. Closed claims must be reported within 60 days of
closure.6 1
The increased information should prove useful to DOI in identi-
fying potential disciplinary problems. Since DOI is required to re-
port to DPR any physician or osteopath who has three or more
paid indemnities within a five-year period, the increased informa-
tion will assist DPR in initiating mandatory investigations of doc-
tors with recurrent claims as required by sections 4 and 5 of the
Act.6 2
57. Ch. 85-175, § 9, Fla. Laws 1180, 1191 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.412 (1983), to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 395.041(10)).
58. Id. § 7, Fla. Laws at 1187 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.912 (1983)).
59. Id. (creating FLA. STAT. § 627.912(3)).
60. Use of the NAIC form to enhance closed claims reporting requirements was first
recommended in the ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supa note 10, at 17, and partially included in
Fla. CS for HR 522 sec. 4 (1984).
61. Ch. 85-175, § 7, Fla. Laws 1180, 1187 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.912 (1983)).
62. Fla. HB 1352 (1985) (Second Engrossed) provided that thresholds for mandatory or
triggered review be two paid claims within five years, which would have produced an annual
review of about 30 doctors, according to DOI. When the Conference Committee met, the
Senate conferees verbally requested that thresholds for mandatory or triggered review be
increased to three paid claims within a five-year period. The Senate position prevailed, ch.
85-175, § 4, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1185 (amending FLA. STAT. § 458.331(1)(t), (5), (6) (1983));
id. § 5, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1186 (amending FLA. STAT. § 459.015(1)(t), (5) (1983)), which
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The purpose of the increased reporting requirements is to pro-
vide DOI and the public with increased data about closed malprac-
tice claims.63 There is a dearth of empirical data in the malpractice
area despite inordinate attention from interested parties and the
public.64 More timely and complete data is also intended to assist
DPR in assessing, under the new triggered review provision, doc-
tors who may have problems. Assessment through mandatory or
triggered review limits DPR's discretion by requiring DPR to in-
vestigate a doctor who pays a certain number of indemnities within
a given period. 5 However, since only a few doctors will be reviewed
each year, mandatory review cannot be expected to effect substan-
tial malpractice prevention.6
means that the mandatory review will produce an annual evaluation of about 8 to 10 doc-
tors, which significantly lowers the effectiveness of the Act. Since these closed claims are
public records, DPR is itself capable of reviewing all closed claims reports, and determining
when an investigation is warranted, regardless of the number of closed claims reported
against an individual doctor.
63. See supra note 23.
64. For example, there is no data indicating the extent of actual malpractice in Florida's
hospitals. The only source from which to extrapolate such information is a 1977 California
study. See CAL. MED. Ass'N & CAL. HosirrTAL ASS'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INSURANCE
FEASIBILITY STUDY (1977) (this report is generally known as the Mills Study); see also D.
MILLS, MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY, A TECHNICAL SUMMARY, 128 W.J. MED. 360
(1978). When these findings are applied to Florida, an alarming rate of medical injuries is
projected which far exceeds the approximately 2,500 malpractice suits brought yearly. See
Gov.'s TASK FORCE REP., supra note 10, at 52-53 (showing a projected rate of 92,790 injuries
in hospitals per year of which 15,774 were due to medical negligence).
65. DOI information shows that of 1,544 claims reported in 1980-81, 377 (or 24.4%) were
paid by 149 physicians having multiple claims. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 10,
at 16. See also supra note 62.
66. See supra note 62. Several other provisions in the Act, recommended by various
groups, encourage prevention. DPR's recommendations appear in ch. 85-175, § 29, 1985 Fla.
Laws 1180, 1216 (amending FLA. STAT. § 458.311 (Supp. 1984)), which limits the number of
attempts to pass the Federal Licensing Examinations (FLEX); id. § 34, 1985 Fla. Laws at
1218 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 205.194), which restricts local occupational licensure
without exhibition of a state license or registration; id. § 35, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1219 (amend-
ing FLA. STAT. § 463.011 (1983)), which requires exhibition of licenses; id. § 36, 1985 Fla.
Laws at 1219 (repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 205.195, .197-.199, 480.051 (1983)); id. § 31, 1985 Fla.
Laws at 1217 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 455.2287), which provides penalties for giving
false information; id. § 32, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1217 (amending FLA. STAT. § 458.327 (1983)),
which lists acts constituting a third-degree felony); id. § 33, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1218 (amend-
ing FLA. STAT. § 459.013 (1983)), which lists felonious acts applicable to osteopaths; id. § 30,
1985 Fla. Laws at 1216 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 455.213), which provides for
mandatory continuing medical education; id. § 40, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1223 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 458.337 (1983)), which increases DPR access to reports of disciplinary actions by
medical organizations and hospitals; id. § 41, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1224 (amending FLA. STAT. §
455.241 (Supp. 1984)), which increases DPR access to patient records; id. § 42, 1985 Fla.
Laws at 1224 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 395.017(3)(e)), which allows DPR access to
patient records otherwise having a privileged and confidential status.
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III. MEDICAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION
The Malpractice Reform Act modifies several procedures of the
current legal system. Rather than major changes, these are discreet
reforms which fine-tune the system. A few minor substantive
changes, including modification of the rules of contribution among
joint tortfeasors and rewording the medical standard of care, were
also included in the Act to remedy perceived problems with the
legal system.6 7
A. Pre-suit Screening and Arbitration
Section 14 of the Act adopts for malpractice actions a pre-suit
screening process originally proposed by the Insurance Commis-
sioner's Medical Malpractice Insurance Advisory Council.6 8 The
process provides for a ninety-day pre-suit notice by the claimant,
during which time a prospective defendant's insurer must conduct
some review of the claim which "fairly" evaluates the claim."9 The
The Gov.'s TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, proposed an increase in the member-
ship of the Board of Medical Examiners; its proposal was incorporated in ch. 85-175, § 37,
1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1219 (amending FLA. STAT. § 458.307 (1983)).
Sections 25 and 26 of the Act were original products of the House Subcomm. on Med.
Mal. These provisions include criminal penalties for alteration of medical records, id. § 25,
1985 Fla. Laws at 1214 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 395.0165), and provide for disciplinary
actions for unnecessary diagnostic testing, id. § 26, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1214 (to be codified at
FLA. STAT. § 768.61).
67. One recent study by Prof. Danzon suggests that there is very little correlation be-
tween malpractice insurance premiums based on claim frequency and severity and various
tort reforms enacted in 1975. See Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Mal-
practice Claims, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 115, 137-44 (1984).
68. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 10, at 7-14. This pre-suit screening process
was included in Fla. CS for HB 522 (1984), from which the Act's version was drawn. Appar-
ently, the notice of intent to claim for malpractice need not even specify the basis for such a
claim. See ch. 85-175, § 14, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.57(2)).
69. See ch. 85-175, § 14, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.57(3)(a)). Peer review panels are suggested by the Act as an alternative method of re-
viewing claims, but are not required. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.57(3)(a)(3)). The
original plan recommended in the ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 10, followed an infor-
mal New Jersey model, carried out by insurance companies which used peer review as the
plan base. This so-called "New Jersey plan" is not a state statute or rule of court, and no
90-day waiting period is required under New Jersey law. The 90-day period appears to be a
product of the Insurance Advisory Council. See supra note 68; cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
364, 365 (West Supp. 1985) (90-day pre-suit notice required in medical malpractice cases).
New Jersey does have a voluntary malpractice mediation process, the unanimous findings of
which are admissible before a jury. See N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. § 4:21-1 to 4:21-8 (1985). The
"New Jersey plan" is actually a voluntary agreement between insurers and trial attorneys to
screen malpractice claims through a peer review process. The Medical Inter-Exchange of
New Jersey entered an informal understanding with the Association of Trial Lawyers of
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insurer can require the claimant to appear before a review panel
and to undergo a physical exam. The claimant must cooperate or
risk later dismissal of his claim. 70 Presumably, the insurer or re-
view panel could interrogate the claimant concerning his malprac-
tice claim. Interestingly, there is no corresponding ability of a
claimant to interrogate the prospective defendant or insurer about
the claim or defense, although both sides must make discoverable
information available.71 Statements generated in the review pro-
cess are neither discoverable nor admissible. 72
A prospective defendant may respond to the claimant by re-
jecting the claim, making a settlement offer, or admitting liability
and requesting arbitration on damages.73 An attorney representing
a claimant must advise his client in writing of the terms of the
prospective defendant's response, the costs to the client of pro-
ceeding to trial, and the likelihood of success. 4 There is no time
limit for acceptance of a settlement offer, but an offer to arbitrate
damages must be accepted or rejected within twenty days. If ac-
cepted, an offer to arbitrate imposes binding arbitration on both
parties if settlement of damages is not reached within thirty
days.7 5 Section 14 sets out a straightforward procedure for binding
America, New Jersey. The New Jersey ATLA recommended on October 26, 1979 that its
New Jersey members afford the Exchange 90 days to investigate a claim before the attorney
files the suit. Each side is requested to disclose theories of liability or defense. The Ex-
change will supply the medical records, if available. If only damages are contested, use of
arbitration is encouraged. See B. GENEST, REPORT TO -THE FLORIDA DEPARTuENrr OF INSUR-
ANCE'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE ADvISORY COUNCIL (Attach. D, Exhib. I) (Sept. 9,
1982) (on file with Fla. Dep't of Ins.) [hereinafter cited as GENEST REP.].
70. Ch. 85-175, § 14, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.57(3)(a)).
71. Id. (to be codified at FL. STAT. § 768.57(6)).
72. Ch. 85-175, § 14, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.57(5)).
As with many procedural changes, a manipulative party can exploit the intricacies of the
system. Even though information an insurer gleans through the review process is not di-
rectly admissible or discoverable, knowledge of such information could easily be exploited to
produce admissible evidence. Pre-suit screening may simply be used by some prospective
defendants as a tool to build a better defense. Section 14 of the Act requires "parties" to
make available discoverable information during the process. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 768.57(6)). This raises the interesting possibility that such information would later be
inadmissible under FLA. STAT. § 768.57(5).
73. Ch. 85-175, § 14, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.57(3)(b)).
74. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.57(3)(d)).
75. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.57(7)). Since an offer of liability and arbitra-
tion on damages apparently could be withdrawn anytime, it seems anomalous to limit claim-
ant's acceptance time to 20 days, especially since there is no limit for settlement offers.
Apparently this 20 day period would run subsequent to the 30 day period during which
claimant's attorney may transfer the offer, although this is unclear.
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arbitration on damages, which incorporates the Florida Arbitration
Code.76 During this process, the statute of limitations is tolled as to
all potential defendants."
Section 14 of the 1985 Act was based largely on the version in
Committee Substitute for House Bill 522 proposed during the 1984
Regular Session of the legislature. During the 1985 Regular Ses-
sion, this provision remained practically unchanged through two
months of constant rewriting of the billy.7 The sole purpose of this
section has always been the encouragement of earlier and more fre-
quent settlement of meritorious claims. 9
Once a claimant goes through pretrial screening and counsel
76. Ch. 85-175, § 14, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1199 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.57(9)).
77. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.57(4)). Thus, if a claimant serves notice of a
claim on one defendant, the statute of limitations is tolled during the 90-day period as to all
"potential" defendants which the claimant might later join. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 768.57(4)). Additionally, a claimant could have another 60 days after the prospective de-
fendant rejects the claim or after an offer of arbitration is rejected by a claimant. Id. (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.57(7)(a)). A claimant need only reject an offer to arbitrate after
20 days, so there is another tolling potential here. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.57(7)). Finally, a claimant may obtain an automatic 90-day extension for reasonable
investigations of bad faith claims required by section 12 of the Act. Id. § 12, 1985 Fla. Laws
at 1196 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.495(3)). These combined provisions potentially
allow for a maximum eight-month extension of the statute of limitation for all potential
defendants. This is significant since the current malpractice statute of limitations may be as
short as two years. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1983). This concession by defendants seems
reasonable in view of the delay that pre-suit screening and statutory investigation require-
ments impose on claimants. Note, however, that section 14 of the Act is internally inconsis-
tent: while it clearly requires only that notice be served on prospective defendants, since no
case has yet been docketed, the section also seems to require filing of the notice with the
court to toll the statute of limitations. See ch. 85-175, § 14, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1199 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT § 768.57(2)-(3)), cf. id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT § 768.57(4)).
If a plaintiff files a complaint within the limitation period but fails to file or serve a notice
of intent to initiate litigation within the period, a question arises as to whether the statute
of limitation is tolled. The Act requires that a notice of intent be filed (served) within the
limitation period. See ch. 85-175, § 14, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1199 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 768.57(2)). The Act does not indictate that failure to do so results in the running of
the statute of limitation. Whether the courts will construe a complaint as tantamount to the
notice of intent is an open question. Since the defendant is already on notice of the litiga-
tion after a complaint, dismissing the action and allowing the limitations period to run pro-
duces a rather harsh, overly technical result. Also, a defendant would be encouraged to wait
out any remaining limitations period and then raise objection for failure to serve a notice of
intent. Otherwise, a plaintiff could simply file the notice and amend his complaint to show
compliance. Such "ambush" tactics should not be encouraged through overly technical ap-
plication of the Act.
78. Small changes were made, such as the addition of a longer nonsuit period consistent
with the sovereign immunity statute for governmental entities, FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (Supp.
1984), and the deletion of a minimum $250 thousand limit on general damages as part of an
offer to admit liability and arbitrate damages.
79. See supra note 23.
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complies with the requirements under section 12 for certification of
reasonable investigation of the claim, suit may be filed.80 After fil-
ing suit, the plaintiff and defendant may then be required by the
court to submit to a mandatory mediation process as specified by
section 15. Although the Act denotes this proviso as "court-ordered
arbitration," it is more accurately described as a mediation pro-
cess. The panel hearing the case cannot make a "determination,"
instead, it can only make a recommendation to assist settlement of
the claim.8 1 The entire process bears a haunting similarity to the
Medical Mediation Panels established by the Medical Malpractice
Reform Act of 1975.82 The mediation panels under the 1975 Act
fell when the court in Aldana v. Holub8" found that time limits in
the mediation process, particularly a ten-month limit that could
not be extended, operated arbitrarily to deny parties due process. 4
Under the new Act, unless a panel hearing is scheduled within
ninety days of selection of panel members, which must occur
within forty days of submission to arbitration, the panel arbitrarily
loses its authority over the matter. 5 Notably, court-ordered arbi-
80. A certificate is only required of claimants who hire an attorney. A claimant proceed-
ing pro se would not be obligated to file a certificate of reasonable investigation and good
faith belief of grounds for suit. A written opinion from a medical expert is not a prerequisite
to proof of good faith, but is merely an exemplary and presumptive means of proof. If an
attorney could not obtain the client's medical records from a potential defendant, the attor-
ney's good faith efforts should suffice, even though a medical opinion might be impossible to
obtain under those circumstances. Further, the written expert opinion could simply state
that there is apparent evidence of medical negligence. Cf. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE. §§ 411.30-
.35 (West Supp. 1985) (similar statutory requirement).
81. Ch. 85-175, § 15, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1202 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575).
This definition of the mediation process is based on the definitions contained in a recent
study on mediation and arbitration. LEGISLATIVE STUDY COMM'N ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, FINAL REPORT (Appendix B) (Mar. 1, 1985) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Health Care & Ins.) [hereinafter cited as DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP.]. This report notes that
the point of mediation is to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement, a process similar to
the Malpractice Reform Act's court-ordered arbitration. Conversely, the point of arbitration
is to submit a disputed matter for determination. Id. at B-1, 2.
82. For a comprehensive history of the mediation panels, see Ehrhardt, One Thousand
Seven Hundred Days: A History of Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels in Florida, 8
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 165 (1980).
83. 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
84. Id. at 235-36.
85. See ch. 85-175, § 15, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1202 (to be codified at FLA. STAT §
768.575). One could fairly characterize the Act's arbitration provision in section 15 as an
attempt to circumvent the clear warning of Aldana that a mandatory mediation process is
unavoidably unconstitutional. The Commission on Alternative Dispute Settlements deter-
mined that the entire mediation process should last no longer than 90 days to satisfy access
to court requirements under Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1041 (1977). See DISPUTE RESOLUTION REP., supra note 81, at 7. The Act's arbitra-
tion provision could delay a case up to 130 days.
764 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:747
tration under section 15 is neither binding on the parties nor ad-
missible in a later trial.86 Although the process is mandatory if or-
dered by the court, there are no penalties for failure to accept the
panel's suggested award.87
As with the ninety-day screening process, court-ordered arbitra-
tion is designed to encourage early and more frequent settlement
of meritorious claims. However, because there are few incentives to
actively participate in the arbitration process, it is doubtful that
the process will achieve these goals. Since the process is supple-
mental to the judicial proceedings, one could expect that the over-
all costs of malpractice cases will increase for both plaintiffs and
defendants.88 Furthermore, it will be difficult to assess whether ar-
bitration actually encourages settlement since ninety percent of
malpractice cases currently settle without arbitration.89
86. Ch. 85-175, § 15, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1202 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.575(2)(h)).
87. See id. This arbitration provision is the only section in Fla. HB 1352 (1985) that is
based on any provision in the Senate malpractice bill, Fla. CS for SB 1232 (1985). The
Senate bill contained penalties of attorney's fees, arbitration fees, and costs assessed against
a party who rejected the panel's suggested award and then failed to obtain a more favorable
judgment. Fla. CS for SB 1232, sec. 11 (1985) also made this process mandatory, rather than
discretionary with the court, in all malpractice cases.
88. Although the arbitration section is ostensibly distinct from the parallel judicial pro-
cess, the provision does prohibit at trial "any reference to insurance, insurance coverage, or
joinder of the insurer," directly affecting the court procedure. Ch. 85-175, § 15, 1985 Fla.
Laws 1180, 1202 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575(2)(h)). The legislature's choice of
this language poses a potential constitutional problem. This insurance reference prohibition
was taken directly from FLA. STAT. § 768.47, which is repealed by the Act and which is a
statutory remnant of the old medical mediation panels that were declared unconstitutional
in Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980). See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text. In Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), the Florida Supreme Court found
the insurance reference prohibition of § 768.47, then codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.134(1)
(1975), unconstitutional as an infringement on the court's rulemaking powers. The court,
nevertheless, agreed with the policy behind the statute. To resolve any potential problems
in application, the court adopted the substance of the statute as FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(e).
Carter, 335 So. 2d at 806. Later the court declined to delete the rule, see The Florida Bar: In
re Rules of Civil Procedure (Deletion of Rule 1.450(e)), 429 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1983), but after
further consideration the court withdrew the rule as an inappropriate separate rule for mal-
practice cases, see In re Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 458 So. 2d 245, 254-55
(Fla. 1984). Interestingly, the court upheld a similar nonjoinder statute that apparently ap-
plies only to automobile and related casualty insurance. VanBibber v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983) (holding FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (Supp. 1982)
constitutional); see generally Note, Statute Which Prohibits Joinder of a Liability Insurer
in an Action Against Its Insured Held Constitutional, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 425 (1984).
Thus, given the court's prior treatment of insurance reference prohibitions, this new enact-
ment should also be unconstitutional under Carter. Nonjoinder is now the rule for automo-
bile and casualty insurance cases but may not necessarily be the rule for malpractice insur-
ance cases.
89. See Gov.'s TASK FORCE REP., supra note 10, at A-7.
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The success of both the ninety-day screening process and the ar-
bitration procedures depends largely on the good faith assessment
of claims by defendants and their insurance companies. Insurers
wishing to exploit these new procedures can use both procedures
for delay, a tactic ultimately to the advantage of insurers who are
not liable for prejudgment interest 90 Moreover, since a claimant is
required to comply with the pre-suit screening process for each de-
fendant, the potential exists for multiple interrogations of a claim-
ant by successive review panels of various insurers. Indeed, the
benefit of these provisions of earlier, more frequent settlement is
precariously balanced against the risk of further delay to the meri-
torious claim.
B. Offer and Demand for Judgment
The Act adopts in section 16 a new offer of judgment rule for
malpractice actions, which allows either side to make a settlement
offer and imposes a penalty of attorney's fees for unreasonable re-
jection of the offer. Unreasonable rejection by a plaintiff exists
when a plaintiff obtains a judgment which is at least twenty-five
percent less than the defendant's offer.9 1 Unreasonable rejection by
a defendant exists when a defendant must pay a judgment which is
at least twenty-five percent greater than the plaintiff's demand.2
This section was generally motivated by the recently proposed
changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 concerning offers of
judgments, which would allow the imposition of attorney's fees and
prejudgment interest for unreasonably rejecting an offer.9 3 The
90. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
91. Ch. 85-175, § 16, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1205 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.65).
92. Id.
93. Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68 reads as follows:
Rule 68. Offer of Judgment Settlement; Sanctions
At any time more than .0 days before the trial begins; a party detending agalnst
a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer mtalow judgment W be taken
against him or the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with
costs then accrued. 1f within iu days altr the service of the ofter the adverse
party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then ie
the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and there-
upon the clerk shali enter judgment. An offer not accepted shai be deemed with-
drawn and evidence thereof is not admissibie except in a proceeding to determine
costs. if the judgment finaiily obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than
the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.
The fact that an ofer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent
offer. W'hen the iiability of one party W another has been determined by verdict
or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the iiabifty remains o be de-
termined by further proceedings, the party adjudged iiabie may make an offer0
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Act's actual procedural changes were based more directly on the
recommendations of the Insurance Advisory Council, which were
incorporated by the legislature in Committee Substitute for House
Bill 522 during the 1984 Regular Session.94
judgment, which shal have the same effect as an offer made before triai if it is
served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement
of hearings o determine the amount or extent of iiabiity.
At any time more than 60 days after the service of the summons and complaint
on a party but not less than 90 days (or 75 days if it is a counter-offer) before
trial, either party may serve upon the other party but shall not file with the court
a written offer, denominated as an offer under this rule, to settle a claim for the
money, property, or relief specified in the offer and to enter into a stipulation
dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. The offer
shall remain open for 60 days unless sooner withdrawn by a writing served on the
offeree prior to acceptance by the offeree. An offer that remains open may be ac-
cepted or rejected in writing by the offeree. An offer that is neither withdrawn nor
accepted within 60 days shall be deemed rejected. The fact that an offer is made
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. Evidence of an offer is not
admissible except in proceedings to enforce a settlement or to determine sanctions
under this rule.
If, upon a motion by the offeror within 10 days after the entry of judgment, the
court determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably, resulting in unnecessary
delay and needless increase in the cost of the litigation, it may impose an appro-
priate sanction upon the offeree. In making this determination the court shall con-
sider all of the relevant circumstances at the time of the rejection, including (1)
the then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim that was the subject of the
offer, (2) the closeness of the questions of fact and law at issue, (3) whether the
offeror had unreasonably refused to furnish information necessary to evaluate the
reasonableness of the offer, (4) whether the suit was in the nature of a "test case,"
presenting questions of far-reaching importance affecting non-parties, (5) the re-
lief that might reasonably have been expected if the claimant should prevail, and
(6) the amount of the additional delay, cost, and expense that the offeror reasona-
bly would be expected to incur if the litigation should be prolonged.
In determining the amount of any sanction to be imposed under this rule the
court also shall take into account (1) the extent of the delay, (2) the amount of the
parties' costs and expenses, including any reasonable attorney's fees incurred by
the offerer as a result of the offeree's rejection, (3) the interest that could have
been earned at prevailing rates on the amount that a claimant offered to accept to
the extent that the interest is not otherwise included in the judgment, and (4) the
burden of the sanction on the offeree.
This rule shall not apply to class or derivative actions under Rules 23, 23.1, and
23.2.
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Proposed Rules, 9 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at G342-43 (Nov. 1984) (words in Struck through type are deletions from existing
law; words underlined are additions.)
94. Fla. CS for HB 522, sec. 10 (1984). See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 10, at 13.
The prevailing party's attorney's fees rule, FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1983), is repealed by ch. 85-
175, § 43, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1225. This repeal was necessary to implement the new offer
of judgment rule, awarding attorney's fees based on unreasonable rejection of an offer. The
repeal was also deemed advisable since most interested parties agreed that FLA. STAT. §
768.56 was ineffective to prevent suits or encourage settlements. Repeal was also recom-
mended in the ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 10, at 1-2.
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The changes to the offer of judgment rule could bring about
more frequent and rapid settlements. 6 By significantly penalizing
unreasonable rejection of settlement offers, the Act could actively
encourage both sides to make and accept realistic offers. Neverthe-
less, current law does provide prevailing party attorney's fees in
malpractice cases, theoretically encouraging settlement to avoid
trial. Under current law, a defendant can avoid the attorney's fees
by making an offer which proves more favorable than a later judg-
ment.96 One may fairly question whether the Act's new offer of
judgment rule has significantly altered the existing attorney's fees
statute, or whether the Act has merely rearranged an unpopular
procedural device.
Much of the potential for use of the offer of judgment as a set-
tlement device was stifled by the elimination of prejudgment inter-
est for the plaintiff.9 7 Interest would have run from the time the
demand was made if the demand proved to be twenty-five percent
less than plaintiff's judgment.98 The prejudgment interest penalty
was deleted in Conference Committee at the Senate's request." As
a result, insurance companies defending malpractice claims will
continue to be economically motivated to refuse early settlement
since they can earn significant investment interest on the retained
monies. 100 Protracted litigation will continue to benefit insurers by
95. The new provision at least alters the procedure in Florida for handling offers of judg-
ments in malpractice cases. Under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442, an offer of judgment, until accepted,
may not be filed with the court. The Act's offer of judgment provision seems to require filing
regardless of acceptance. Because this area is traditionally one of procedure, rather complex
problems are raised regarding whether the conflicting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pre-
empt this new state provision; they would appear to. This provision, as well as all of the
other procedural changes in the Act, arguably runs afoul of the state constitution's delega-
tion of practice and procedure to the Florida Supreme Court, in violation of the separation
of powers clause. This problem is pervasive throughout the Act. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3;
id. art. V, § 2.
96. FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1983) (repealed by ch. 85-175, § 43, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1225).
97. Compare ch. 85-175, § 16, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1205 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.65) with Fla. HB 1352, sec. 15 (1985) (Second Engrossed).
98. Fla. HB 1352, sec. 15 (1985) (Second Engrossed).
99. See supra note 23.
100. To encourage early settlement, a growing number of states have enacted statutes
which allow prejudgment interest in tort cases. Approximately 20 states now allow such
prejudgment interest. See generally Ross & Goelz, Prejudgment Interest in Tort Suits
Sometimes Added, NAT'L L.J. 14, 20-21 (Apr. 29, 1985). Often the award of prejudgment
interest is tied to a favorable settlement offer having been rejected. California allows a
plaintiff 10% prejudgment interest from the date of plaintiff's settlement offer which is less
than his resulting judgment. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3291 (West Supp. 1985). Wisconsin has a
similar provision. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-85). Pennsylvania
allows 10% prejudgment interest on compensatory damages unless the defendant makes a
1985]
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allowing retention of such investment income.1"'
Severe problems may also exist in the mechanical approach of
the Act's offer of judgment rule. There is no judicial discretion to
allow for cases that do not fairly warrant imposition of attorney's
fees, regardless of whether a favorable offer was made. Conversely,
there is no discretion under the rule to award attorney's fees if a
judgment is only twenty-four percent more or less favorable than
an offer. The trigger for attorney's fees is arbitrary and inflexi-
ble. 10 2 By comparison, proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68
allows a judge to consider subjective factors in determining unrea-
sonable rejection, such as the merit of a party's position, close legal
questions, and information withheld by an offeror. 03 If the legal
issues were close and the merits of a party's case were strong, it
might be inequitable to award attorney's fees to a party mathemat-
ically prevailing by the twenty-five percent factor. Moreover, the
1985 Act provides no method to judicially screen sham offers made
by defendants merely to exploit the penalty provisions of the offer
settlement offer prior to trial and plaintiff does not recover more than 125% of the offer.
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., R. Civ. P. 238 (Purdon Supp. 1985). This Pennsylvania statute
bears a striking resemblance to the offer of judgment provision in Florida's 1985 Medical
Malpractice Reform Act. Michigan also mandates prejudgment interest on tort judgments
unless a defendant makes an offer equal to or more favorable than the judgment. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6013 (West Supp. 1985). Some states do not tie prejudgment inter-
est for tort suits to offers of judgment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-25 (Cum. Supp. 1983)
(allowing prejudgment interest on compensatory damages for tort, if covered by insurance).
101. This advantage to insurers of delaying settlement until it is unavoidable is well
recognized. The Fla. Dep't of Ins., Medical Malpractice Ins. Advisory Council, received tes-
timony regarding the insurance practice in New Jersey, and that state's efforts to combat
the practice:
In New Jersey, we have pre-judgment interest which, although not particularly
liked by the insurance companies, was put into effect so that those companies
which wanted to invest their money rather than pay the injured party would have
to pay 12% interest at the time of trial going back to six months from the date the
case was originally filed.
GENEST, supra note 69, at 7; see also N.J. R. CT. 4:42-11(b) (1985). As a result, the Insurance
Advisory Council recommended allowance of prejudgment interest to a plaintiff making a
favorable offer. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 10, at 13. Prejudgment interest is
especially appropriate once a plaintiff makes a favorable offer because damages at that point
effectively become liquidated and the defendant will have to ultimately pay at least as much
as the offer in order for the offer of judgment rule to operate. The traditional argument
against prejudgment interest is that damages in tort are unliquidated and therefore prejudg-
ment interest should not be awarded on an uncertain amount. See Ross & Goelz, supra note
100, at 14. Plaintiff's demand precipitates liquidation, obviating this objection. See Bergen
Brunswig Corp. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 415 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982),
approved, Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 10 Fla. L.W. 353 (July 5, 1985) (prejudg-
ment interest part of full compensation).
102. Ch. 85-175, § 16, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1205.
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 68, supra note 93.
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of judgment rule. ' "
Most of these problems could be avoided by abandoning the
mathematical formula of the Act in favor of the subjective stan-
dards of proposed Federal Rule 68, which grants the judge discre-
tion in determining when a party has acted unreasonably in re-
jecting an offer and the type and amount of sanction to be
imposed.10 5 Without subjective factors such as good faith, the Act's
mechanical rule, although easy to apply, could produce inequitable
results. To avoid these problems, a good faith standard must be
read into the Act's offer of judgment rule until a more flexible rule
can be adopted.
C. Attorney's Fees
In section 17 of the Act, attorney's fees in malpractice cases are
addressed, and standards for presumptively reasonable contingent
fee amounts are set forth. The first part of this section merely cod-
ifies general standards of reasonableness for all attorney's fees.'"s
The second part sets out a schedule of percentages of a recovery
which are presumed reasonable for plaintiff's contingent attorney's
104. The entire problem of determining the subjective factor of unreasonable rejection
by a mathematical formula was studiously avoided in proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 68. The fed-
eral rules committee recognized that broad discretion was necessary in an offer of judgment
rule, especially when significant penalties such as attorney's fees and prejudgment interest
were involved. See Committee Note, supra note 93, at G343-46. The complexities of an offer
of judgment rule have created convoluted problems even under the straightforward, existing
rule. See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981) (defendant cannot recover costs
under offer of judgment rule when plaintiff lost at trial, only when plaintiff recovered less
favorable judgment; avoids confronting issue of sham offers). Sham offers by defendants are
a problem under existing law, and some courts have read a requirement of good faith into
current FED. R. Civ. P. 68. Id.
Under the Act, sham or token offers by defendants are encouraged since attorney's fees
are awarded regardless of the reasonableness of an offer to encourage settlement. Theoreti-
cally, a defendant could offer one dollar and be entitled to attorney's fees if a plaintiff recov-
ered nothing. However, assuming that Florida courts follow the rationale of Delta Airlines,
a defendant would never be awarded attorney's fees when a plaintiff lost, since there would
be literally no "judgment obtained by the plaintiff" and the rule could not apply. Token
offers could only be effective when a plaintiff actually recovered at least a nominal amount.
Notably, plaintiffs cannot make sham demands. Low demands would be accepted by de-
fendants and unrealistically high demands would avail plaintiffs nothing under the rule be-
cause the judgment must be 25% greater than the demand to trigger attorney's fees. A
separate problem exists when both sides have a 50-50 chance of prevailing since it may be
unfair to penalize a party who acted reasonably under the circumstances by assessing all of
the prevailing party's attorney's fees against the losing party.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 68, supra note 93.
106. Ch. 85-175, § 17, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1205 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.575(1)-(5)).
19851
770 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:747
fees. 10 7
The text for the first part of section 17 comes from the Florida
Code of Professional Responsibility.'0 8 Under these professional
standards promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court, an attorney
is subject to disciplinary action for failure to comply. The Act codi-
fies the existing disciplinary rules and slightly clarifies them.10 9 An
essential addition, however, is court review, upon client request, of
a fee agreement for excessiveness' 10 and the requirement that the
court shall review all divisions of fees between attorneys."' With
this change in current practice, the initial determination of a fees
dispute shifts from the Florida Bar's grievance committee to the
court.
112
The second part of the attorney's fees section, setting forth the
fee schedule, is not based on any existing fee schedule. Rather, it is
essentially a product of the House Committee on Health Care and
Insurance produced in conjunction with interested parties. 1 As
originally submitted, PCB HC 85-2 contained a sliding schedule of
attorney's fees for plaintiffs which ultimately capped contingent
fees at twenty percent of any recovery which exceeded $300 thou-
sand.11 4 This provision proved extremely controversial and drew
heated opposition from the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers and
consumer groups who actively lobbied against the provision."15 As a
result, it was deleted by the Subcommittee on Medical Malprac-
tice.1 6 However, during the meeting of the full House Committee
on Health Care and Insurance, the Act's current schedule was
added as a slightly less offensive limit on contingent fees.' 17 The
107. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575(7)).
108. FLA. BAR CODE PROF. RESP. D.R. 2-106, 2-107.
109. Ch. 85-175, § 17, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1205 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.575(1)-(5)).
110. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575(2)).
111. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575(4)).
112. See FLA. BAR INTEGE. R. BY-LAws, art. V, § 5.
113. Rep. Tom Gustafson drafted this section in consultation with representatives of the
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.
114. Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 14 (draft of Apr. 4, 1985).
115. The members of the House Subcomm. on Med. Mal., of course, recognized that any
limitation on the amount plaintiffs' attorneys could charge would generate great controversy
and opposition from the plaintiffs' bar. However, because of the respective positions of the
House and Senate in previous years, the former generally supporting trial lawyers and the
latter the medical profession, members of the Subcommittee perceived that a malpractice
bill could not pass both chambers without including some regulation of contingent attor-
ney's fees.
116. Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 15 (draft of Apr. 26, 1985).
117. Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 15 (draft of Apr. 30, 1985).
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provision remained in the bill through Conference Committee as
the Senate did not seriously oppose the provision.
.The purpose of the Act's fee schedule is primarily to encourage
early settlement of malpractice claims." 8 Under the structured
schedule, contingent attorney's fees are relatively low in the early
stages of a claim. Defendants are thereby encouraged to settle
early." 9 Overall settlement amounts should be lower as plaintiffs
will necessarily receive a larger part of the settlement.1' 0 Without
the Act, an attorney's normal contingent fee would be thirty to
thirty-five percent of the settlement or judgment amount. Under
the Act, if a defendant settles a claim in the pre-suit screening pe-
riod, the plaintiff's attorney's fees will be presumptively limited to
fifteen percent. 2' Effectively, a defendant is afforded a fifteen to
twenty percent discount in the settlement value of the case. As the
case progresses, the savings available to a defendant decrease. If a
defendant waits until trial is underway to settle, the fee percentage
is only limited to thirty-five percent, which accords with fees gen-
erally charged. 2
There is also an overall presumptive cap of fifteen percent on
the amounts of a recovery exceeding $2 million.' 23 Amounts less
than $2 million are not affected by this limit, so fees of up to $900
thousand could be reasonably charged on those amounts if the case
proceeded to appeal or postjudgment proceedings. This limit was
included as a response to perceived public concern over grossly ex-
cessive attorney's fees based on percentages of multi-million dollar
awards.'2 4 Since there were only twelve Florida malpractice cases
in 1983 for over $1 million, this limitation can be expected to affect
only a handful of cases.' 2 5
The Act's fee schedule is more equitable than the statutes of
other states that merely cap recoveries at certain amounts.'28 The
118. See supra note 23.
119. Id.
120. This, of course, ignores the common practice of many plaintiffs' lawyers who volun-
tarily reduce their fees if a case settles quickly.
121. All of the percentages in the fee schedule are merely presumptions of reasonable-
ness. An attorney could show special efforts or expenses and be entitled to a greater per-
centage. Ch. 85-175, § 17, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1205 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.575(7)(a)).
122. Ch. 85-175, § 17, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1205, (to be codified at FL. STAT. §
768.575(7)(a)(5)).
123. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575(7)(b)).
124. See supra note 23.
125. See Gov.'s TASK FORCE RsP., supra note 10, at A-4.
126. Attorney's fees are regulated by statute in about 20 states. Of these, about one-half
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Act recognizes that a lower fee schedule may fairly be imposed on
plaintiffs' attorneys in the earlier stages of a case since less work is
usually involved. Thus, lower fees tied to the earlier stages of a
case are designed to avoid discouraging plaintiffs' lawyers from ac-
cepting malpractice cases as uneconomical, the primary objection
of consumer groups to contingent attorney's fees caps. 127 The Act
accomplishes its primary goal of encouraging early settlement
without discouraging plaintiffs' lawyers from accepting malpractice
cases.
128
D. Periodic Payment of Future Damages
Section 13 of the Act modifies the existing statute governing the
of the states merely provide for judicial review of reasonableness. The other states impose
percentage limits of some variety. The most restrictive states are Delaware and California
which cap, on a sliding scale, contingent fees in malpractice cases at 10% of the recovery
exceeding $200 thousand. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (1984); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6146 (West Cum. Supp. 1985). The most liberal malpractice fees caps are imposed by
Michigan, Oregon and Tennessee. Those states cap fees at one-third of the recovery, with-
out use of a sliding scale. See MICH. CT. R. 8-121 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 752.150 (1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-120 (1980). New York recently decreased the allowable contingent
fee from one-third of the recovery to about 25% of the first $1 million, 15% of the next $250
thousand, and 10% of amounts exceeding $1.25 million. See ch. 294, 1985 N.Y. Laws.
127. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, WHAT LEGISLATORS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 19 (June 26, 1985) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care &
Ins.) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE]. Since the sliding scale in the new Florida
Act imposes limits only on attorney's fees, services of an investigator for initial screening of
a claim or the costs of a investigation could be charged in excess of the presumptive cap.
128. The Act suggests that the Florida Supreme Court should consider reviewing the
attorney's fees provision and preempting the provision with the court's desired schedule.
Ch. 85-175, § 17, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1205 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575(7)(b)).
The Florida Bar Comm. on Contingency and Referral Practices is currently considering pos-
sible recommendations for supreme court action. The Act's attorney's fees provision does
not become effective until July 1, 1986, allowing one year for the supreme court to act if it
chooses. Without supreme court action or further legislation, the entire provision will expire
on October 1, 1988. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.575(8)).
A recent supreme court decision established parameters for reasonable attorney's fees
awarded under the prevailing party statute, FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1983). See Florida Patient's
Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 10 Fla. L.W. 249 (May 2, 1985). Reasonable fees are to be
based on a "lodestar" amount, which is the hourly rate times a contingency multiplier of 1.5
to 3. Rowe does not establish a reasonable attorney's fee in an attorney-client contractual
setting, but rather sets a reasonable fee which a losing party must pay as a statutory pen-
alty. Id. As such, Rowe will be the guideline in establishing attorney's fees under the new
offer-demand for judgment statute, but will not be a proper guide in the attorney-client
contractual setting. There was no evidence presented to the Subcomm. on Med. Mal. that
significant abuse surrounded the use of contingent attorney's fees in medical malpractice
cases. It is appropriate that the attorney's fees provision primarily encourages early settle-
ment, a goal of unquestionable societal benefit; the provision is not primarily aimed at limit-
ing the amount plaintiffs' lawyers charge their clients.
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periodic payment of future damages in malpractice cases.12 9 The
three noteworthy changes in this section include an increased
threshold before future damages will be structured, a mandatory
grant of requests for periodic payments, and the discontinuance of
payments to a plaintiff who outlives the period. The other changes
in the statute attempt to further balance the equities of structured
payments between plaintiffs and defendants.
Under current law, if future damages exceed $200 thousand ar-
guably all future damages could be subject to periodic payment.130
During the early consideration of House Bill 1352 by the House
Committee on Health Care and Insurance, the Committee consid-
ered several proposals to change the threshold amount."" The Act
as passed settles on structuring payments only when future dam-
ages exceed $500 thousand,s 2 and requires such payments to be
made periodically, when requested by either party.' Although a
request for periodic payments initially leaves no discretion with
the court to grant or deny such a request, the Act allows the judge
to deny the request if manifest injustice would result.' 4
The initial version of the structured judgment provision was
quite different. The House Health Care and Insurance Committee
originally proposed making the request for structured judgments
mandatory, but to offset this change, future general damages
would have been excluded from periodic payment, thereby ensur-
ing a larger lump sum payment to needy plaintiffs.3 5 The Senate
disagreed with the House's proposed rewrite of the statute and ul-
timately succeeded in having the Act include the structuring of fu-
ture general damages.'i 6 However, in addition to prevailing on this
provision, the Senate also managed to have removed from the law
the present detailed categorization of verdicts, which includes past
and future medical expenses, past and future wage losses, and past
129. Ch. 85-175, § 13, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1197 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.51 (1983)).
130. FLA. STAT. § 768.51(1)(a)-(b) (1983).
131. The various proposals to amend FLA. STAT. § 768.51(3) (1983) would have varied the
threshold from $1 million, Fla. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 11 (draft of Apr. 4, 1985), to $500 thou-
sand, Fla. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 12 (draft of Apr. 26, 1985).
132. Ch. 85-175, § 13, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1197 (amending FL. STAT. § 768.51(l)(b)
(1983)).
133. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.51(1)(b) (1983)).
134. Id.
135. Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 11 (draft of Apr. 4, 1985) (proposed amendment to
FLA. STAT. § 768.51(1)(b) (1983)).
136. See supra note 23; FLA. S. Joun. 982 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985) (Conference Com-
mittee Report on HB 1352); FLA. H.R. Joua. 1104 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985) (Conference
Committee Report on HB 1352).
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and future general damages.' Senate conferees were concerned
that the detailed itemization encouraged larger jury awards since
the individual categories de-emphasized the overall size of an
award.' 38 The itemized verdict provision contained in the Act re-
quires itemization only of past and future damages.'39 To utilize a
periodic payments plan, the Act also establishes increased security
requirements that a defendant must satisfy"10 while providing for
increased judicial flexibility in enforcing the defendant's
payments."'
The period over which payments are to be made under the Act is
that which the trier of fact established as the period for which fu-
ture losses were to be awarded. The total amount of the payments
will equal the judgment amount before reduction to present
value."4 2 As for the plaintiff's attorney's fees, these are initially
paid by the plaintiff out of nonstructured damages to a maximum
of the agreed contingency percentage. The remaining amount of
the attorney's fees is paid by the defendant out of the structured
part of the award with an appropriate reduction of the balance.""
The bill, as passed by the House, also would have provided for
extended medical payments to a plaintiff who outlived the period
of structured payments."' This provision was altered at the Sen-
137. Ch. 85-175, § 11, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1197 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.48 (1983)).
138. See supra note 23.
139. See ch. 85-175, § 11, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1196 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.48
(1983)). Unfortunately, deletion of the existing categories of special and general damages
could severely hamper DOI in its efforts to attain reliable statistics concerning relative per-
centages of special and general damages which comprise a verdict. One could conjecture that
without such data, efforts by the Fla. Med. Ass'n to impose a cap on general damages, a now
unknown factor, would also be hampered. Such a change seems especially curious when
other states have increased itemization requirements in order to implement more progres-
sive structured judgment statutes. See Ill. H.B. 1604, secs. 2-1109, 2-1701 to 2-1719 (adopted
as amended May 23, 1985).
140. Ch. 85-175, § 13, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1197 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.51(3)
(1983)); see also Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care & Ins., HB 1352 (1985) Staff
Analysis 4 (final June 4, 1985) (on file with committee).
141. Ch. 85-175, § 13, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1197 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.51(4)
(1983)).
142. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.51(2) (1983)).
143. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.51(6) (1983)). Under the Act, if a plaintiff recovered
$400 thousand in past damages and $2 million in future damages, $900 thousand would be
unstructured and $1.5 million would be structured. Assuming a contingent percentage of
one-third, plaintiff would pay $300 thousand to his attorney and defendant would pay the
remaining attorney's fee of $500 thousand. Plaintiff's lawyer receives his entire fee of $800
thousand and defendant effectively structures the remaining $1 million in future damages.
The foregoing is also a rough approximation of the way the 1983 law may have operated
concerning payment of plaintiff's attorney's fees. See FLA. STAT. § 768.51(6) (1983).
144. Fla. HB 1352, sec. 13 (1985) (Second Engrossed) (proposed amendment to FLA.
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ate's request, 45 such that under the Act if a plaintiff outlives the
projected period the payments simply cease. 14 The discontinuance
of periodic payments to a plaintiff outliving the period is counter-
balanced by another Conference Committee change that allows the
estate of the plaintiff who dies prematurely to receive a lump sum
payment of all outstanding award damages. 147 Under current law,
future medical and pain and suffering losses cease when the plain-
tiff dies.' 4 8
The purpose of altering the periodic payment statute was to en-
courage greater use of it by defendants who faced large awards of
future damages.4 9 The existing statute granted a court the discre-
tion to refuse to impose periodic payments. Such discretion seem-
ingly contributed to the statute's disuse. The primary goal of the
change was to limit this judicial discretion by requiring a finding of
"manifest injustice" before periodic payments could be denied. o
Increasing the structure threshold was simply a balancing conces-
sion to limit the number of cases which could be affected by the
new mandatory provision.151
Although the proposed amendments to the structured judgment
statute created considerable controversy, the efficacy of the
amended statute remains questionable. In spite of the Florida Su-
preme Court's recent removal of the constitutional cloud over the
existing provision, 2 current data indicates that fewer than a
dozen cases could even qualify for potential structured judgment
treatment under the new law.15  Furthermore, judges could be ex-
STAT. § 768.51(2) (1983)).
145. See supra note 23; FI. S. JouR. 982 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985) (Conference Com-
mittee Report on HB 1352); FLA. H.R. JouR. 1104 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985) (Conference
Committee Report on HB 1352).
146. Ch. 85-175, § 13, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1197 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.51(2)
(1983)).
147. Id.
148. See FLA. STAT. § 768.51(1)(b)(5) (1983).
149. See supra note 23.
150. Id.; ch. 85-175, § 13, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1197 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.51(1)(b)
(1983)).
151. See supra note 23.
152. See Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. Von Stetina, 10 Fla. L.W. 286 (May 24, 1985)
(upholding the constitutionality of FLA. STAT. § 768.51 (1983)).
153. See Gov.'s TASK FORCE REP., supra note 10, Appendix at 4, 6. The report shows
that future medical expenses and lost wages account for about 15% of a verdict, while gen-
eral damages account for about 54%. Since part of the general damages is for past pain and
suffering in most cases, one could estimate that all future damages generally represent about
one-half of the award. Twelve Florida cases exceeded $1 million in total damages in 1983;
probably only these cases could meet the $500 thousand minimum for structured judgments.
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pected to find "manifest injustice" in at least some of these cases
and deny the requested periodic payments. In sum, these modifica-
tions to the structured judgment statute cannot be expected to
cause a substantial increase in the use of periodic payments. How-.
ever, the provision should prove advantageous to defendants in
settlement negotiations since the mere threat of its application
should give defendants leverage to obtain more favorable struc-
tured settlements.1 5
E. Standard of Care & Expert Witness Qualifications
One of the few arguably substantive changes made in the Act
rewords the medical standard of care. Instead of the "accepted"
standard of care, which currently defines the duty owed by a
health care provider, the Act defines this medical duty in terms of
the "prevailing professional" standard of care. 155 This change is
one of semantics, which should only tenuously affect the average
Moreover, since only future damages in excess of $500 thousand could be structured, even
fewer cases would warrant structuring as a practical matter. Finally, the structured judg-
ment provision expires on October 1, 1987. See ch. 85-175, § 51, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1229.
It is doubtful that many large malpractice cases will be filed after the provision's effective
date of October 1, 1985, and be brought to final judgment in less than two years.
154. The Act also contains three other minor procedural changes to periodic payments of
future damages. The most important of these is in § 18, which slightly enhances the trial
court's ability to order remittitur or additur in malpractice cases. Note that Florida courts
generally have no authority to order additur other than in medical malpractice and automo-
bile negligence cases. See FLA. STAT. §§ 768.49 (1983); Reinhart v. Seaboard Coast Line Ry.,
10 Fla. L.W. 1470 (2d DCA June 21, 1985). Section 18 deletes the existing requirement of a
finding that a verdict is "clearly" excessive or inadequate before a trial court can intervene.
There is an added expression of legislative intent, subjecting awards in malpractice cases to
close judicial scrutiny. Ch. 85-175, § 18, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1207. The Tort Litigation
Review Commission originally recommended deletion of the word "clearly." TORT LITIGA-
TION REV. COMM., REPORT TO THE FLORIDA BAR, 64-69 (Jan. 1984). This slight modification
brings Florida law into conformity with the laws of most states.
A second minor procedural change in § 12 prohibits the initial pleading of punitive dam-
ages in malpractice cases until an evidentiary showing of a "reasonable basis" has been
made. The change was recommended by the Tort Review Commission in its report at 27-29.
See also ADVISORY COUNCIL REP., supra note 10, at 6. The purpose of this change is to dispel
the in terrorem effect of initial pleadings containing pleas for punitive damages. To date,
there are no reported appellate decisions in Florida sustaining punitive damages against a
medical provider. Therefore, punitive damages themselves would not seem to be a signifi-
cant, practical problem.
The third procedural change mandates settlement conferences in malpractice cases. See
ch. 85-175, § 19, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1208. It is patterned after CAL. R. CT. 222 (1985),
except that a plaintiff is not required under the Florida Act to file an itemized demand, as
in California. Since federal courts already follow this practice, see FED R. Civ. P. 16, Florida
courts would simply be brought into line with the federal practice.
155. Ch. 85-175, § 10, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1194 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.45(1)
(1983)).
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juror's interpretation of the applicable standard of care. Further,
since the breach of the duty of medical care is normally an issue of
fact for the jury, the changed language will have little utility for
appellate purposes.
One possible purpose of rewording the duty owed by a health
care provider is to emphasize that the standard of acceptable med-
ical care falls within a spectrum of professional behavior. The
point is further made by other changes in this section which allow
consideration of "all relevant surrounding circumstances."' 56 This
reading, though, is undercut by other parts of the Act. The level of
care must still be recognized as "acceptable and appropriate" by
the reasonable health care provider, 1' returning one inexorably to
the prior statute's requirement of "accepted" standard of care.
Indeed, under the new wording, a reasonable argument can be
made that a health care provider is placed under a greater burden
to stay abreast of new medical technology and developments. The
"prevailing" standard of care offered by the majority of modern
medical providers may well be more exacting than the accepted
standard of care. Further, under the Act, health care must not only
be "acceptable" but must also be "appropriate" and in accord with
prevailing professional standards.1 58 The Act seems to impose a




159. This rewording of the standard of care was originally proposed by the Subcomm. on
Med. Mal. See Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 8 (draft of Apr. 4, 1985). This proposed commit-
tee bill also contained language that required that the standard of care be "liberally con-
strued in favor of health care providers." Id. Provision was also made for consideration of
respected minority opinions. Id. Both of these provisions were deleted from the bill in sub-
committee due to strong opposition from consumer groups. Fla. H.R., Subcomm. on Med.
Mal., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 22, 1985) (on file with committee) (discussion of
Amendment 28). Even though the Act appears to impose a greater spectrum of duties on
providers, other changes in the health care system may help define and limit these duties.
The adoption of prospective payment systems, such as Medicare's diagnostic related groups
(DRGs), may help standardize acceptable medical treatment under given circumstances.
Similarly, utilization review may foster uniformity of a standard of care. See MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE, supra note 127, at 8. Restriction of utilization, whether under a DRG system, a
health maintenance organization, or a preferred provider organization (PPO), also offers a
potential of increased liability exposure for both the provider and the entity controlling
utilization. See Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Pol-
icy Analysis, 59 Tax. L. Rv. 1345, 1395-1400 (1981); Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice
Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1375; Note, Rethinking
Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. Rav. 1004 (1985);
Comment, California Negotiated Health Care: Implications for Malpractice Liability, 21
SAN DIaGO L. REV. 455 (1984). Under a PPO plan, a group of physicians or hospitals agree
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In this same section, the Act increases the requirements for
medical expert witnesses. The Act requires medical experts to have
practiced or taught medicine within a five-year period prior to the
malpractice incident at issue.160 This change was designed to deal
with the professional medical expert, or "hired gun."161
It is questionable whether this change will accomplish a cost re-
duction in the malpractice system. Presumably, since a plaintiff
must now have a more qualified expert, the plaintiff's case should
be more thoroughly prepared. Also, the plaintiff's expert will be
less open to attack on cross-examination for lack of practical expe-
rience or enjoyment of a large income derived from testifying as a
medical expert. Further, experts with better medical qualifications
would cost both sides more. Conversely, a requirement for experts
with better practical qualifications could possibly decrease the fre-
quency of frivolous or nonmeritorious malpractice suits.1"'
F. Joint and Several Liability
The second substantive change in the claims resolution system
occurs in section 20 of the Act, which deals with comparative fault
and contribution in malpractice cases.163 Although this section is
rather long, its changes are minimal, solely affecting the right of
contribution among three or more medical, joint tortfeasors. 1 The
Act provides for a more equitable distribution of an insolvent de-
fendant's share of a judgment among at least two solvent defen-
dants, based on the proportionate share of fault of the solvent de-
fendants. 1 5  This change is patterned after the Uniform
with an insurer to provide care for insured individuals at negotiated and typically dis-
counted rates, subject to utilization guidelines. These guidelines may be used by plaintiffs to
establish a minimum standard of care to which a provider must adhere or be attacked as
falling below an acceptable standard of care, thereby exposing the entity which set the
guidelines to direct liability.
160. Ch. 85-175, § 10, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1195 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.45(2)(c)
(1983)).
161. This change was originally proposed in Fla. CS for HB 522, sec. 7 (1984), arising
from a compromise position between the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers and south Flor-
ida doctors.
162. The qualifications of a witness are initially determined by the court, effectively act-
ing as a trier of fact. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a); FLA. STAT. § 90.105(1) (1983). Because an
expert witness' qualifications would be screened by the trial court and fully explored on
cross-examination, the Tort Litigation Review Commission opposed increasing statutory re-
quirements for medical experts. TORT LTIGATION REV. COMM., supra note 154, at 59-63.
163. Ch. 85-175, § 20, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1208 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.59).
164. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.59(3)).
165. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.59(2)(c)). A large part of the impetus for
including a provision in the malpractice bill affecting joint and several liability undoubtedly
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Comparative Fault Act, which is altered in several significant as-
pects."'6 Critically, the Malpractice Act does not provide for reallo-
cation onto a plaintiff-at-fault.6 7 It applies only in medical mal-
practice cases. The Act retains current Florida law as to the effects
of settlement, providing that a claim is reduced by the amount of
originated in response to the movement in the House to abolish the doctrine of joint liability
among joint tortfeasors. See Fla. HB 1037 (1985), which passed the House but died on the
Senate calendar. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1985 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS at 142, HB 1037. In the Conference Committee's consideration of HB 1352, the
Senate conferees wanted partial abolition of joint liability, along the lines of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, see infra note 166. However, under the rules, only the version in
Fla. HB 1352, which affected contribution among joint tortfeasors, or Fla. HB 1037, which
abolished joint liability completely, were available as options to the Senate conferees, who
ultimately chose the former.
The joint liability doctrine has been under attack in recent years. However, only five of
the less populous states, including Kansas, New Mexico, and Vermont, have abolished joint
liability. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1983); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply,
646 P.2d 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1984). Approxi-
mately eight states have partially abrogated joint liability, typically abolishing the rule only
when the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the defendant's. See, e.g., Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 2212a, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West Supp. 1985).
Often, the motivation for abolition or partial abrogation of joint liability is to protect public
entities from devastatingly large judgments when the public entity was only partially at
fault. See Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 60 (July, 1985)
(citing several cases in which California cities faced paying multimillion dollar awards). This
underlying justification for abolition of joint liability is particularly inappropriate in Florida
where public entities, including cities, are already protected from judgments exceeding $100
thousand by sovereign immunity. See FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (Supp. 1984).
166. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act was originally approved by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1977. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT
ACT, 12 U.L.A. 40 (Supp. 1985). It provides for an insolvent defendant's share of a judgment
to be reallocated among all other defendants and plaintiffs, in accordance with relative de-
grees of fault. For example, assume plaintiff was 20% at fault, defendant A was 50% at
fault, defendant B, 20%, and defendant C, 10%, and the judgment was for $100 thousand.
If defendant A were insolvent, plaintiff could currently collect $80 thousand (for which he
was not at fault) from either B or C. Under the Uniform Act, all solvent defendants and
plaintiff must absorb a proportionate share of the insolvent amount ($50 thousand), based
on relative degrees of fault. Thus, plaintiff would absorb two-fifths of the uncollectible $50
thousand ($20 thousand), defendant B, two-fifths ($20 thousand), and defendant C, one-
fifth ($10 thousand). Defendant B would pay a total of $40 thousand and C a total of $20
thousand. Only Minnesota has adopted the Uniform Act, and has done so only in principle.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (West Supp. 1985). For a detailed and erudite explanation of
the Uniform Act, see Note, The Modification of Joint and Several Liability: Consideration
of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 288 (1984).
167. Ch. 85-175, § 20, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1208 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.59(3)(a)). Reallocation onto the plaintiff was originally provided in the initial draft of
the proposed committee bill. Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 18 (Apr. 4, 1985). Reallocation
was deleted in subcommittee due to opposition from consumer groups, and in recognition of
the fact that relatively few medical malpractice cases involve jury findings of contributory
negligence of the patient himself. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care & Ins., tape recording of
proceedings (Apr. 22-24, 1985) (on file with committee) (discussion of HB 1352 (1985)).
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the settlement and the settling party is released from all liability
for contribution.8 8
The Act does, however, alter one part of the existing contribu-
tion statute, which prohibits any tortfeasor from paying contribu-
tion beyond his pro rata share. Under current law, when there are
three or more defendants, an insolvent defendant's share is paid by
whomever the plaintiff chooses; thus, a targeted defendant may be
called upon to pay more than an equitable share. 16 9 Under the Act,
a targeted defendant is placed in a better position to seek contri-
bution, which may be collected in excess of a pro rata share if cir-
cumstances warrant. 170
This change should help targeted defendants, such as hospitals,
seek more equitable contribution from solvent joint tortfeasors,
such as doctors. Further, if one doctor is underinsured and another
is overinsured, a hospital could seek excess contribution from the
overinsured doctor, assuming that underinsurance is tantamount
to uncollectibility under the Act.
There are problems in the complicated, interrelated area of in-
demnity and what effect, if any, the Act has on enhancing rights of
indemnity. It is conceivable that a vicariously liable defendant,
seeking recovery by way of indemnity, could recover less from a co-
defendant than a partially-at-fault defendant seeking contribu-
tion.17' It is unclear whether reallocation principles of the Act can
apply when indemnity is the basis of recovery.
168. See Ch. 85-175, § 20, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1208 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.59(5)); FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1983). The Uniform Act shifts the entire burden of estimat-
ing a settling tortfeasor's percentage of liability to the plaintiff. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985). For example, if a plaintiff settles with one defendant
for $5 thousand when that defendant's fault is later determined to be 25% of a $100 thou-
sand judgment, plaintiff absorbs a $20 thousand loss. This could easily discourage settle-
ment and was deleted for that reason.
169. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (1983). If defendant A were 50% liable but insolvent,
B 30% liable, and C 20% liable, and C paid the entire $100 thousand judgment, C could
only recover $30 thousand from B through contribution.
170. See ch. 85-175, § 20, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1208 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
768.59(4)). In the example at supra note 169, C could recover three-fifths of the insolvent
amount ($50 thousand) from B, or $30 thousand in addition to B's proportionate share of
the liability (30% of the $100 thousand), for a total of $60 thousand. B would pay only $40
thousand.
171. This would assume that in indemnity a codefendant is only liable for his pro rata
share of the judgment. Indemnity is only available to a defendant who was held vicariously
or indirectly liable. Direct fault of a defendant, however slight, bars indemnity recovery. See
Houdaille Indus. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979). Certainly, a faultless defendant
should be able to collect as much through indemnity as a partially-at-fault defendant could
collect through contribution.
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IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
A. Financial Responsibility
The Act's only major change to the malpractice insurance sys-
tem imposes financial responsibility requirements for physicians17
and osteopaths.17 3 These doctors are required, as of January 1,
1987, either to maintain an escrow account or to obtain malprac-
tice insurance. 17 4 Minimum levels are $100 thousand per claim,
$300 thousand annual aggregate for doctors practicing outside of
hospitals, and $250 thousand/$750 thousand for doctors with hos-
pital staff privileges. The $100 thousand/$300 thousand require-
ment is a condition of licensure. The higher $250 thousand/$750
thousand level is a condition of hospital staff privileges, and is pre-
sumably enforceable by the hospital.1 7 5
Mandatory financial responsibility requirements were initially
recommended by the Insurance Advisory Council.176 The rationale
of mandatory financial responsibility is three-fold. First,
mandatory coverage ensures that victims of malpractice will re-
ceive at least certain minimum levels of compensation from the
tortfeasor.17 7 Second, mandatory coverage effectively spreads the
172. Ch. 85-175, § 27, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1214 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 458.320).
173. Id. § 28, 1985 Fla. Laws 1215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 459.0085).
174. Id.; ch. 85-175, § 27, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1214 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
458.320). Ironically, FLA. STAT. chs. 458 and 459, containing the financial responsibility re-
quirements, are repealed on October 1, 1986, and must be reviewed pursuant to FLA. STAT. §
11.61 (1983) prior to that date. It is not altogether clear whether the new financial responsi-
bility requirements survive this Sunset review. If not, they would be repealed prior to ever
becoming effective.
175. Ch. 85-175, § 27, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1214 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 458.320);
id. § 28, 1985 Fla. Laws 1215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 459.0085). The higher coverage
requirement for hospital doctors appears to be predicated on the hospital's power to grant
or deny staff privileges. The Act is unclear whether HRS could use hospital licensure powers
under FLA. STAT. ch. 395 to coerce hospital compliance with this insurance requirement.
Since the requirements appear in FLA. STAT. chs. 458 and 459 governing doctors' licensure,
HRS's power to enforce this requirement is questionable.
176. See ADviSORY COUNCL REP., supra note 10, at 23. This recommendation was en-
dorsed by the Insurance Commissioner. See FLA. INS. COMM'R REP., supra note 24, at 25-26.
The Governor's Task Force also recommended mandatory coverage. See Gov.'s TASK FORCE
REP., supra note 10, at 121-22.
177. This rationale would certainly dictate that state and county doctors also meet mini-
mum financial responsibility requirements to ensure compensation for injuries. Due to
strong lobby opposition by state agencies and certain public hospitals in south Florida, state
and county doctors were exempted from meeting any financial responsibility requirements.
See ch. 85-175, § 27, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1214 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 458.320(4); id.
§ 28, 1985 Fla. Laws 1215 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 459.0085(4)). Mandatory insurance
would have resulted in a partial waiver of sovereign immunity by these state doctors, to the
extent of insurance coverage. See FLA. STAT. § 286.28 (1983); Ingraham v. Dade County
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risk of loss among a larger number of doctors, and ultimately could
lower insurance premiums of doctors who have voluntarily ob-
tained coverage. 178 Finally, mandatory coverage prevents certain
hospitals from soliciting medical staff by declining to require mal-
practice insurance as a condition of hospital staff privileges. 179
House Bill 1352 originally required mandatory coverage in the
amounts of $1 million per claim with a $3 million annual aggregate
by August 1, 1987.180 In Conference Committee, the Senate op-
posed any mandatory financial responsibility requirements, but
eventually the Senate conferees accepted the reduced requirements
that appear in the Act.181 The effect of financial responsibility re-
quirements for doctors is speculative. If DOI statistics are reliable,
almost ninety-eight percent of doctors are already insured. 182 Since
required levels of coverage are relatively low, the Act may have
almost no effect on increasing insurance coverage for Florida
doctors.
Challenges should be expected to the constitutionality of requir-
ing financial responsibility for doctors, both on the basis of denial
of due process and equal protection. In the handful of states that
have enacted mandatory insurance laws, the majority of these pro-
visions have withstood constitutional challenge."8 3 If Florida courts
School Bd., 450 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1984). The public agencies were concerned about increased
financial exposure to injured patients, who are now limited to a maximum recovery of $100
thousand, exclusive of the political claims bill process through which a random minority of
claimants with judgments receive additional compensation. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (Supp. 1984).
As a result of this exclusion, radiologists and anesthesiologists employed in a public hospital
supported by a taxing district need not meet financial responsibility requirements; the same
doctors employed in private hospitals must demonstrate financial responsibility. The Act
inconsistently applies the insurance requirements to federally employed doctors who have
Florida licenses.
178. According to DOI data, 98% of all Florida doctors have malpractice insurance, al-
though the levels of coverage are unknown. About three-quarters of all Florida hospitals
require doctors to carry malpractice insurance. More than one-half of these require coverage
of $500 thousand or more. See Gov.'s TASK FORCE REP., supra note 10, at A-29. Given the
current high percentage of coverage, one can assume that some insurance typically is availa-
ble to compensate injured patients.
179. See supra note 23.
180. Fla. H.B. 1352, sec. 27 (1985). Minimum limits of $1 million/$3 million were passed
by the House based on DOI data showing those limits to be the median level of coverage in
Florida. See Memorandum from J. Vogel to D. Hazlett, (Mar. 1, 1985) (on file with Fla.
H.R. Comm. on Health Care & Ins.) (discussing the limits of medical malpractice liability
insurance).
181. See supra note 23.
182. See supra note 178.
183. See generally Note, Constitutionality of Requiring Physicians and Other Health
Care Providers to Carry Malpractice Insurance, 7 W. ST. U.L. REV. 75 (1979). State courts
in Idaho, Kansas, and Pennsylvania have rejected constitutional challenges to mandatory
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follow this trend when reviewing the Act's financial responsibility
requirements, the constitutionality of the requirements should be
sustained.184
B. Group Malpractice Insurance
As previously mentioned, the Act specifically allows health care
providers to join together to purchase a group medical malpractice
policy. 1 Section 23 describes one possible type of group malprac-
tice policy that a hospital, at its option, may purchase to cover
negligent acts of its medical staff. The cost of this policy can be
passed on to the medical staff."'6 As another option, a hospital may
require its staff member to pay a deductible amount.1 8 7 As these
provisions are all optional, this part of the Act merely encourages
more efficient insurance arrangements in which the hospital takes
on the primary role. Nothing is mandated.'"
In contrast, the 1985 New York Legislature passed a medical
malpractice law which significantly altered the New York malprac-
tice insurance system.189 The New York law requires that all mal-
practice insurers offering policies with primary limits of $1 million
per claim/$3 million annual aggregate, or greater, must provide
identical $1 million/$3 million excess coverage. Moreover, the in-
surer must provide any additional, requested excess coverage, sub-
ject to the insurance superintendent's approval. This law essen-
malpractice insurance. See Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 576 P.2d 221 (Kan.
1978); McCoy v. Commonwealth, 391 A.2d 723 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978). Interestingly, the
mandatory malpractice insurance required by these states, under laws originally passed al-
most a decade ago, is typically $100 thousand/$300 thousand. This fact attests to the inade-
quate levels of coverage under Florida's new law. One state court in Kentucky has specifi-
cally declared mandatory insurance violative of its state constitutional guarantee of due
process. However, the court's reasoning is extremely clouded. See McGuffey v. Hall, 557
S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977). The decisions upholding mandatory insurance are generally better
reasoned. New York recently enacted legislation standardizing $2 million/$6 million mini-
mum limits for malpractice insurance coverage. See ch. 294, 1985 N.Y. Laws.
184. The Florida Supreme Court has generally required merely a rational basis to sup-
port the constitutionality of malpractice legislation. See Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp.
Corp., 403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981). Unless a stricter standard is applied, the constitutionality
of mandatory malpractice insurance seems assured.
185. See supra note 17, and accompanying text. Group policies are sanctioned by the
Act. See ch. 85-175, § 22, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1211 (amending FLA. STAT. § 626.973 (1983)).
186. Ch. 85-175, § 23, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1211 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.60).
187. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.60(2)).
188. See id. These optional group insurance plans were proposed by the Florida League
of Hospitals as a substitute for the hospital vicarious liability provision which was deleted
due to strong opposition from hospital lobbies. See supra note 17, and accompanying text.
189. Ch. 294, 1985 N.Y. Laws.
1985]
784 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:747
tially mandates that excess insurance coverage be made available
to a doctor or hospital requesting such coverage.""°
The New York law contains another innovative approach to mal-
practice insurance. Hospitals that render emergency medical care
must provide the excess malpractice coverage of $1 million/$3 mil-
lion for each member of their emergency medical staff. The New
York law mandates that hospitals take on the primary role of
purchasing excess coverage earmarked for their emergency care
staff. This law moves in the direction of efficiently channeling mal-
practice claims through the health care facility, rather than target-
ing individual doctors.' 9'
Because the malpractice malaise is primarily a concern over high
malpractice insurance rates, a legislative focus on malpractice in-
surance itself would seem to be of first order. The Florida Legisla-
ture could be expected to examine the lead of New York in reorga-
nizing the basic malpractice insurance system, and in future
sessions move toward significant reforms in this critical area.192
190. Id. Many Florida hospitals opposed a proposal in the committee version of HB 1352
that would have imposed vicarious liability on hospitals for the negligence of their medical
staff. Hospitals based their objections on the unavailability of excess insurance and reinsur-
ance. FLA. LEAGUE OF HOSPITALS, POSITION PAPER, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PCB 85-2, SECTION
21 at 3 (May 8, 1985) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care Ins.). The New York
approach of mandated excess insurance could be used to dispel some of this concern. See
infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
191. Ch. 294, 1985 N.Y. Laws. See also infra notes 195-211 and accompanying text. In
both New York and Florida, hospitals have been held vicariously liable on agency principles
for the negligence of their emergency room doctors. A mandate that a hospital provide ex-
cess coverage is eminently pragmatic and serves both the hospital and the staff doctor. See
Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Irving v. Doctors
Hosp. of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
192. The Act also contains several minor malpractice insurance reforms. The Act re-
quires an insured to cooperate with the 90-day pre-suit screening process. The insurer is
given ultimate authority to settle a case. Ch. 85-175, § 6, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1187 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.4147). See also supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. Ac-
cording to a national survey, the "single most important impediment to settlement was re-
ported to be the defendant's right to refuse to allow a settlement." W. CURRAN, How LAW-
YERS HANDLE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES: AN ANALYSIS OF AN IMPORTANT MEDICOLEGAL
STUDY at 17 (Feb. 1977) (U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. and Welfare; National Center for
Health Servs. Research Rep. Ser.; D.H.E.W. (Pub. No. (HRA) 77-3152). The Act also re-
quires a malpractice insurer generally to give 60 days notice before cancellation. Ch. 85-175,
§ 6, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1187 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.4147(1)(c)). This notice
period was added after complaints were received from south Florida neonatologists whose
policies had been perfunctorily cancelled by their malpractice insurers. Finally, insurers are
authorized to require their insureds to be members in good standing of local professional
societies with medical review committees. Id. (to be codified at FL. STAT. § 627.4147(2)).
This change is designed to encourage greater participation in risk management and peer
review at the local, professional society level. See supra note 23.
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V. KEY DELETED PROVISIONS
The original bill proposed by the Subcommittee on Medical
Malpractice contained two provisions that represented dramatic
and progressive changes to the basic medical malpractice system.
The first of these proposals would have imposed vicarious liability
on a hospital for the negligent acts of the hospital's medical
staff.' 3 The second proposal would have capped doctors' malprac-
tice insurance premiums at a level based on the individual doctor's
income. 94 Both of these far-reaching changes were deleted due to
lobbying by medical groups. They are examined here in anticipa-
tion of their resurrection in future sessions.
A. Hospital Vicarious Liability
The Subcommittee on Medical Malpractice proposed a most
fundamental change in the medical malpractice system: hospitals
and other health care facilities would become legally responsible
for all acts committed in furtherance of the hospital medical care
complex. 19 5 The hospital's liability would be vicarious, not direct.
It need commit no negligent act to be held liable for negligence of
its medical staff, just as an employer or principal is vicariously lia-
ble, regardless of his own lack of fault, for the negligence of an
employee or agent.
This proposed change echoed a basic shift in the status of the
hospital within the modern health care complex. The hospital is no
longer merely the "doctor's workshop," furnishing facilities and
equipment. Rather, it is the center of an incredibly complicated
and technologically advanced organization providing comprehen-
sive health care. The public perceives the hospital as the quintes-
sence of the modern health care system:
The community hospital has evolved into a corporate institution,
193. Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 21 (draft of Apr. 4, 1985).
194. Id. sec. 22.
195. See supra note 15 for the original language of the hospital liability provision in Fla.
H.R. PCB HC 85-2 (1985). This language was altered twice before its eventual deletion.
First, the full House Comm. on Health Care & Ins. exempted noninvasive, medical diagno-
ses from medical acts for which a hospital would be vicariously liable. Fla. H.R., Comm. on
Health Care & Ins., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 29, 1985) (on file with committee)
(discussion of Amendment 1). Second, the bill was amended in the House Comm. on Ap-
prop. to limit the amount of damages for which a hospital could be vicariously liable. Fla.
H.R., Comm. on Approp., tape recording of proceedings (May 7, 1985) (on file with commit-
tee). Both amendments were included in a futile effort to make the vicarious liability princi-
ple acceptable to hospital interests.
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assuming "the role of a comprehensive health center ultimately
responsible for arranging and coordinating total health care." The
patient treated in such a facility receives care from a number of
individuals of varying capacities and [is] not merely treated by a
physician acting in isolation. The patient relies upon the effec-
tiveness of this "highly integrated system of activities . .. ."
Consequently, "[tihe concept that a hospital does not undertake
to treat patients, does not undertake to act through its doctors
and nurses, but only procures them to act solely upon their own
responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. The complex manner of
operation of the modern-day medical institution clearly demon-
strates that they furnish far more than mere facilities for treat-
ment. They appoint physicians and surgeons to their medical
staffs, as well as regularly employing on a salary basis resident
physicians and surgeons, nurses, administrative and manual
workers and they charge patients for medical diagnosis, care,
treatment and therapy, receiving payment for such services
through privately financed medical insurance policies and govern-
ment financed programs known as Medicare and Medicaid. Cer-
tainly, the person who avails himself of our modern 'hospital fa-
cilities' (frequently a medical teaching institution) expects that
the hospital staff will do all it reasonably can to cure him and
does not anticipate that its nurses, doctors and other employees
will be acting solely on their own responsibility." 1"
Time and health care have thus changed.
In the shadow of this increasingly integrated medical care com-
plex, a consensus has arisen that the current negligence system
does not effectively prevent medical malpractice or serve to realign
the incompetent or marginally incompetent doctors. 97 Recognizing
that between seventy-five and eighty percent of medical malprac-
tice occurs in hospitals,19 8 one has to conclude that the entity best
able to control this health care environment must do so and be
encouraged to do so with diligence. 99 The question recurs as how
196. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (as
modified).
197. See Note, Reallocating Liability to Medical Staff Review Committee Members: A
Response to the Hospital Corporate Liability Doctrine, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 115, 120 (1984);
Note, supra note 18, at 350 & n.64.
198. Note, supra note 18, at 353.
199. "[T]he hospital is in the best position to evaluate the competence of physicians...
as it constitutes the only institutional 'vehicle available to coordinate the delivery of health
care of reasonable quality to large numbers of people .... '" Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164
(quoting Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change its
Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 429, 466 (1973)).
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best to achieve this.
As health care has become increasingly centralized and institu-
tionalized within the hospital complex, the law has acknowledged
the increased control of these institutions over the health care sys-
tem and has steadily imposed more liability on the hospital for
medical injuries occurring within the facility. Increased control has
fostered increased responsibility, which will ultimately engender
legal liability. As Professor Southwick, accurately observes in his
excellent article:
The trend toward increased imposition of vicarious liability upon
the hospital has been observable for more than two decades.
When medical care is provided by a highly specialized, sophisti-
cated team of professional individuals all working within an insti-
tutional setting, it is frequently difficult to determine at any given
point in time who is exercising direct control over whom. Where
such difficulty in determination arises, it is only natural and logi-
cal that ultimate liability be placed upon the corporate institution
and not upon the private physician2°0
As hospitals assume greater roles in coordinating and overseeing
the delivery of comprehensive health care, distinctions between in-
dividual physician responsibility and institutional responsibility
are increasingly difficult to support. Compartmentalization of
health care providers according to artificial legal concepts, such as
that of independent contractor, has simply become
inappropriate.2 0 1
Vicarious liability for hospitals acknowledges the hospital's true
position in the medicolegal system. This concept comports with
reasonable patient expectations. For patients, the hospital is the
linchpin in the medical care complex. Patients are undoubtedly
surprised to learn that hospitals may have no responsibility for
negligent acts of medical staff doctors committed under the aus-
pices and protocols of the hospital. Vicarious liability also recog-
nizes that hospitals and doctors receive mutual economic benefits
from the health care enterprise, and that these benefits are ines-
200. Southwick, Hospital Liability: Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEGAL MED.
1, 16 (1983). Professor Southwick convincingly argues that the formerly independent theo-
ries of hospital corporate negligence and vicarious liability have merged into a single con-
cept of hospital responsibility. Id.
201. "It should rather be acknowledged that, in the hospital setting, there is no longer a
viable distinction between the rules of respondeat superior [vicarious liability], on one hand,
and corporate or independent negligence, on the other." Id. at 46.
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capably symbiotic. Since the benefits of a doctor's hospital practice
are derivative to the hospital, logically the hospital's liability for
the doctor's acts should also be derivative.0 2
Significant advantages to society are gained through imposition
of hospital vicarious liability. Hospitals have an economic stake in
pursuing effective risk management with vigor, since they are the
party responsible for all negligence occurring within the hospital.
Vicarious liability effects a system of "channeling," whereby an in-
jured patient need sue only the single responsible organization.
Since there is no need to prove a separate negligent act by the
hospital in failing to monitor a negligent doctor, the problems asso-
ciated with proving the hospital's notice by means of sensitive dis-
ciplinary or patient records are entirely avoided by expanding hos-
pital vicarious liability.2 03 Further, the health care organization can
better spread the risk of loss from malpractice over its broader fi-
nancial base. Consolidation of liability would allow hospitals and
doctors to lower defense costs by allowing presentation of a uni-
form, common defense. This could well encourage earlier settle-
ments of meritorious claims since fighting among defendants and
their insurers over who is to blame for an obvious incident of mal-
practice would be largely eliminated. 0 ' Consolidation of risks
would allow simplification of the present insurance system by con-
centrating insurance coverage on the hospital rather than on indi-
vidual doctors.20 5 Development of joint liability insurance pro-
202. Prof. Southwick also implies that hospitals may not be able to delegate to a physi-
cian, as an independent contractor, a duty of care owed to the public or community at large.
Further, if hospital care could be considered an inherently dangerous activity, the hospital
could not delegate to doctors its duty of patient care. See id. at 5.
203. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. Because a plaintiff would have such
a difficult time gathering proof of a hospital's notice that a doctor has previously been negli-
gent, the fear of hospital corporate liability based on its negligence may prove an inadequate
incentive to effectively manage risks.
204. See Note, supra note 18, at 352-54 & n.84.
205.
The American courts have always favored doctrines that result in simplification of
rules on the liability of an enterprise for injuries to the public it serves. Simplifica-
tion leads to reducing the need for lengthy and complex litigation. . . . [T]his
simplification also usually results in lower costs of insurance, since the administra-
tive costs of investigation and trial are substantially reduced. Economies of scale
are achieved by concentrating insurance coverage in the corporate structure rather
than individualizing costs and claims reserves around each practicing physician,
which is further complicated by the different premium rates for the various medi-
cal specialties. This complex rate structure would no longer be necessary if cover-
age were provided at the hospital level.
Curran, A Further Solution to the Malpractice Problem: Corporate Liability and Risk
Management in Hospitals, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 704, 704-05 (1984).
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grams should result in lower insurance costs. 06
These compelling reasons have led several authorities to support
the concept of vicarious liability for hospitals. The American Bar
Association, through its Commission on Malpractice, recommended
for serious consideration the advantages when hospitals assume re-
sponsibility for the negligent acts of their medical staff.20 7 Profes-
sor Southwick is one of the most consistent supporters of hospital
vicarious liability.208 Other medical malpractice commentators also
recommend adoption of this concept.20 9
When hospital vicarious liability was proposed by the House
Subcommittee on Malpractice, hospitals raised one overriding and
ostensibly cogent objection: vicarious liability will raise hospital
malpractice insurance rates.210 Assuming that hospitals and doc-
tors continue to buy separate policies from separate insurers, as is
currently done, this objection may have merit. But such an as-
sumption is not valid. Indeed, the entire thrust of hospital vicari-
ous liability is unification of liability concurrent with unification of
insurable risks. As such, the only sensible insurance scenario under
a system of joint liability is joint liability insurance:
Although it would be very difficult to accomplish in an indus-
try still characterized as being engaged in free enterprise, it is
206. Until legal liability of doctors and hospitals is actually consolidated through princi-
ples of vicarious liability, cosmetic efforts to implement joint insurance policies naming doc-
tors and hospitals as coinsureds are futile. These parties will still have adverse interests
under a system that can impose total fault for a malpractice incident on the doctor alone.
Under the current system, hospitals have an adverse interest in establishing total fault on
the doctor as an independent contractor. Group insurance under such adversarial circum-
stances is not pragmatic. Shared liability and responsibility is an essential part of a success-
ful group insurance program.
207. ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABLLrrY 54, 85-86
(Oct. 1977) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care & Ins.); see also Note, supra note
10, at 353 n.82, for other authorities making the same proposal.
208. See generally Southwick, supra note 200.
209. Curran, supra note 205, at 704-05; see also Note, supra note 18, at 353-54. One
commentator has recently proposed a rebuttable presumption of joint hospital-physician
liability whenever failure to adequately hospitalize patients or order tests results in medical
injury. The presumption would apply automatically to those patients receiving care under
Medicare's diagnostic related group (DRG) reimbursement scheme. See Note, Rethinking
Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HAJv. L. REV. 1004, 1019-
22 (1985). DRGs are a cost-cutting system which allow a predetermined rate of reimburse-
ment for a patient's DRG classification, regardless of services rendered. The Harvard Law
Review commentator asserts that both the hospital and physician should share equally in
the increased risk of malpractice suits brought about by these cost-cutting efforts under
Medicare. One problem with such a presumption is the possibility of increased litigation
between hospitals and physicians over the application of the presumption itself. Id. at 1021.
210. FLA. LEAGUE OF HosPrTALs POSMION PAPER, supra note 25.
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time for the hospital, all its employees, and all physicians admit-
ted to membership on the medical staff to be insured by the same
insurance carrier. This would do much to eliminate the damage
that results from the casting of blame or fault upon codefendants
in the context of litigation. It would also do much to reduce the
costs and the excessive length of the litigation process. When the
doctor is insured by one carrier and the hospital by another, there
is strong incentive to advance the classical defenses to respondeat
superior and to maintain distinctions between vicarious and di-
rect liability of the hospital. In the long run this is unproductive
and very costly to the health care industry as a whole. In turn, it
is costly to patients.
Short of hospitals and staff physicians joining together to be
insured by the same carrier, agreements should be developed be-
tween carriers for hospitals and physicians respectively to share
joint liability in negligence or malpractice cases arising in the hos-
pital or institutional setting. Rather than attempting to cast lia-
bility upon the doctor, for example, the hospital carrier should
simply agree to share liability with the doctor's carrier. Likewise,
the reverse would be true. Over the longer term, savings in both
cost and trauma would likely be realized. Hospitals and physi-
cians have more to gain than lose by cooperating with each other
on the development of joint liability insurance programs to facili-
tate claim settlement and to provide for payment of judgments
that may be rendered. Continuation of the current adversary rela-
tionship among multiple defendants can only result in continually
escalating costs.2 11
Simplification of the overall malpractice insurance system through
legal consolidation of insurable risks will inevitably be more effi-
cient and serve society more effectively.
Hospital vicarious liability is an innovative principle. As such, it
was met with hostility and mistrust when proposed by the Sub-
committee on Malpractice. This concept is also progressive. For
these reasons, it can be expected to reappear in the medical mal-
practice arena.
211. Southwick, supra note 200, at 49-50 (footnote omitted). Prof. Southwick notes that
this system has long been in operation in England, where doctors are considered employees
of the hospital. Id. at 49 n.122. See also supra note 190. Consolidation of insurance would
also eliminate any need for a hospital to seek indemnity or contribution against its staff
doctor whose negligence has caused the hospital to be held vicariously liable. Since one in-
surer would cover both the hospital and its doctors, probably under a single group policy,
the insurer would have no need to seek indemnity or contribution from its own insured
doctor. This elimination of indemnity and contribution actions serves to further reduce
costs to the entire system.
1985] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
B. Caps on Malpractice Insurance Premiums
A second, fundamental restructuring of the malpractice system
was also proposed by the House Subcommittee on Malpractice, but
was deleted in Conference Committee. The bill proposed, through
the Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association
(FMMJUA),212 a malpractice premium cap for physicians and os-
teopaths. These doctors would be able to buy insurance from the
FMMJUA, with a maximum premium equal to the greater of $5
thousand or fifteen percent of the individual doctor's gross medical
income.213 The FMMJUA would write insurance up to $1 million
212. The FMMJUA ensures that medical malpractice insurance is available on an invol-
untary basis. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(4) (1983). Health care providers who are unable to
obtain coverage, either because they are involved in high-risk specialities or because of unfa-
vorable claims experience, can obtain insurance from the FMMJUA, although at expectedly
higher rates. Florida law requires that most liability insurers participate in the FMMJUA,
effectively pooling high-risk medical insureds among all liability insurers. Rates set by the
FMMJUA are, in theory, actuarially sound. If a deficit does occur, insureds may be assessed
up to one-third of their yearly premium. Remaining deficits are absorbed by the participat-
ing insurers, on a pro rate basis. Id.
213. Relevant parts of the special risk category, appeared in the proposed committee bill
as follows:
627.351 Insurance risk apportionment plans.-
(4) MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RISK APPORTIONMENT.-
(d) . . . The plan shall include, but shall not be limited to:
4. Establishment of a special risk category, which includes a premium cap on the
rates paid by physicians licensed under Chapter 458 and osteopaths licensed
under Chapter 459, equal to the greater of $5,000 or 15 percent of the physician's
or osteopath's gross income derived from the delivery of medical services. A physi-
cian or osteopath seeking the imposition of the premium cap on his rates shall
have the burden of establishing his gross income derived from the delivery of
medical services to the association's satisfaction.
6.
(e) The underwriting deficit which exists for the special risk category in subpara-
graph (d) 4. for any policy year shall be recovered first from the Florida Medical
Malpractice Trust Fund, created from the following sources:
1. Each insurer, self-insurer, and Joint Underwriting Association, in addition to
taxes imposed elsewhere, shall annually pay to the Department of Revenue, a
surcharge on medical malpractice premiums collected from physicians licensed
under Chapter 458, osteopaths licensed under Chapter 459 and health care facili-
ties licensed under Chapter 395, equal to 10 percent of the gross amounts of such
premium receipts. The insurer's payment of this surcharge shall be a condition
precedent to doing business in this state. ...
20( If there is any remaining special risk category deficit under the plan after
maximum collection of the premium contingency assessment, after collection from
the Florida Medical Malpractice Trust Fund, such deficit shall be recovered from
the companies participating in the plan in the proportion that the net direct pre-
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per claim/$3 million annual aggregate.214 Doctors qualifying for the
premium cap would be part of a "special risk category." Deficits
produced by this premium cap would be primarily subsidized by a
ten percent surcharge on malpractice insurance premiums of hospi-
tals and doctors.215 Any remaining special risk deficit would be
paid by participating insurers, partially offset by a fifty percent tax
credit.21 6
miums of each such member written during the calendar year immediately preced-
ing the end of the policy year for which there is a deficit assessment bears to the
aggregate net direct premiums written in this state by all members of the associa-
tion. The term "premiums" as used herein means premiums for the lines of insur-
ance defined in s. 624.605(1)(b), (k), and (q), excluding homeowner's, mobile
home, and farm owner's casualty, including premiums for such coverage issued
under package policies. Any company which is assessed for an underwriting deficit
under this paragraph shall receive a 50 percent tax credit, of the amount assessed,
against its state income tax payable under Chapter 220, Florida Statutes.
Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2, sec. 22 (Apr. 4, 1985) (words in struck through type are deletions
from existing law; words underlined are additions).
214. The FMMJUA can presently write limits of $250 thousand/$750 thousand. See FLA.
STAT. § 627.351(4) (1983). This was not altered by the Malpractice Reform Act. Increases in
the current FMMJUA limits were recommended by the Insurance Commissioner. FLA. INS.
COMM'R REP., supra note 176, at 25 (limits should be $1 million/$3 million and $2 million/$4
million). The limits of $1 million/$3 million in Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2 also coincided with
original mandatory malpractice limits.
215. DOI projections showed that the 10% premium surcharge would produce approxi-
mately $31.7 million with FMMJUA limits of $1 million/$3 million. At FMMJUA limits of
$500 thousand/$1.5 million, the surcharge still produces $29.1 million. DOI also projected
that only $27 million in subsidy was needed for the special risk category, capped at 15% of a
doctor's gross medical income. See Memo from B. Bodiford to Rep. A. Simon (May 9, 1985)
(on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care & Ins.) (discussing income limitations on
malpractice premiums). Doctors' income by speciality was derived from the Gov.'s TASK
FORCE REP., supra note 10. at A-35, which produced an average annual income for all spe-
cialties of $184,281, using the weighting of the study. According to a recent survey, Florida's
doctors gross one-fourth more than the national average and also net more than doctors in
all other states. See Owens, How Doctors' Economic Profiles Vary in 13 Major States, MED.
ECON. 242, 246-47 (Feb. 6, 1984).
216. Due to the predilection of the House Comm. on Fin. & Tax. to generally oppose tax
credits, the committee deleted this tax credit when it heard the bill. Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Fin. & Tax., tape recording of proceedings (May 6, 1985) (on file with committee). Of the 20
states with medical joint underwriting associations, 6 states have tax credit provisions to
offset deficits of the joint underwriting association. Most of these provisions are 100% cred-
its. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-26-29 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.214 (Smith-Hurd
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62F.06 (West Supp. 1985). Colorado allows a 50% tax credit,
similar to that proposed in Fla. H.R. PCB HC 85-2 (draft of Apr. 4, 1985). See CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 10-4-908 (Supp. 1984). HB 1352 was amended on the House floor to allow limited
deficit assessments against participating doctors, effectively increasing their potential expo-
sure for malpractice premiums. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 393 (Reg. Sess. May 16, 1985) (adoption of
Substitute Amendment 3). The entire special risk category was deleted in Conference Com-
mittee due to the Senate's opposition. FLA. S. JOUR. 982 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985) (Confer-
ence Committee Report on HB 1352); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1104 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985) (Con-
ference Committee Report on HB 1352). See supra note 23.
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The special risk category was essentially the product of the
House Subcommittee on Malpractice. 17 The purpose of this sec-
tion was to ensure that malpractice coverage was not only availa-
ble, but also affordable. Affordability was defined in terms of per-
centage of a doctor's gross medical income, based on the premise
that doctors with a greater medical income could afford to pay
higher malpractice rates.21 8 Doctors who would qualify for the spe-
cial risk category are generally high-risk specialists such as sur-
geons, obstetricians/gynecologists, and anesthesiologists. These
doctors generally pay disproportionately high malpractice rates
due to the risks associated with their areas of practice.219
The special risk category created a mechanism by which doctors
paying disproportionately high malpractice rates could be subsi-
dized by other sources dependent upon these health care special-
ists. Hospitals and general practitioners were both included in the
subsidizing class because they rely heavily upon high-risk special-
ists for the delivery of comprehensive medical services.220
High-risk specialists serve a vital role in the delivery of health
care. This group is, however, the primary target of malpractice
suits and accordingly pays extraordinarily high malpractice premi-
217. The Governor's Task Force did describe a system which subsidized malpractice pre-
miums based on doctor's incomes. Gov.'s TASK FORCE REP., supra note 10,at A-39.
218. See supra note 23.
219. Based in part on rate increases effective July 1, 1985 by St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Co., Florida's largest medical malpractice insurer, DOI, Bureau of Rates, esti-
mated that the average Florida doctor's insurance rate in 1985 is about $10,300. See memo-
randum from J. Vogel to F. Hawkes (July 19, 1985) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health
Care & Ins.) (estimating average liability insurance). This average is extremely low when
compared to the highest rate of $92,600 charged by St. Paul's for neurosurgeons in Dade
and Broward Counties. DEPr. OF INS. & TREASURER, BUREAU OF RATE.S, PHYSICIANS AND SUR-
GEONS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY RATES SCHEDULE (July 9, 1985) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm.
on Health Care & Ins.). There are only about 133 neurosurgeons in Florida. Similarly, obste-
tricians in Dade and Broward pay $73,100 for St. Paul's coverage, although obstetricians in
other counties pay $48,800. Id. The lowest rates charged by St. Paul are to family physicians
not in Dade or Broward Counties who perform no surgery, amounting to $5,900. Id. Family
practice doctors comprise the largest category of physician insureds, exceeding 5,000. Rates
are based on limits of $1 million/$3 million.
220. Other subsidizing sources were considered in the initial drafting of Fla. H.R. PCB
HC 85-2 (draft of Apr. 4, 1985). One such alternative source was a gross receipts tax on
medical services. This tax has the advantage of spreading the subsidization across a very
broad base of health care delivery. Since the entire health care system depends heavily on
high-risk specialities, broad allocation of the subsidy throughout the health care system is
warranted and achieves optimum socialization of malpractice insurance costs. A second al-
ternative source considered was a hospital staff privileges fee. Since highly specialized doc-
tors typically center their practices in hospitals, staff membership gives the general practi-
tioner access to these specialists. A fee for staff privileges would also discourage doctors
from spreading their practices too thinly through multiple staff memberships.
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urns. If the medical malpractice problem is really one of excessive
malpractice insurance rates, a systematic approach dictates that
this high-risk group must have its rates controlled. The special risk
category would have done exactly this. By capping malpractice
rates based on gross income, the proposal effectively controlled the
maximum amount any Florida doctor would have to spend from
his income for malpractice insurance. The costs of capping these
rates would then have been spread across the health care system,
defraying the impact of these extraordinary rates. In this manner,
malpractice insurance affordability problems could have been
resolved.
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida's new malpractice legislation represents the first signifi-
cant effort in ten years by the legislature to deal with specific
problems in the area of medical malpractice. Its major innovations
affect medical risk prevention by allocating greater duties and
powers to health care facilities in a scheme of comprehensive risk
management. Discreet reforms affecting the claims resolution sys-
tem and insurance system complement risk prevention reform.
Nevertheless, the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform
Act of 1985 may be more notable for what it lacks than for what it
provides. Radical tort reforms advocated by medical interests, such
as limiting damages for pain and suffering or abolition of joint and
several liability, are conspicuously absent from the Act. Also ab-
sent are important preventive reforms such as hospital vicarious
liability and much needed malpractice insurance reforms such as
limits on malpractice insurance rates. The Act has left much un-
done. It remains to be seen whether the Florida Legislature ulti-
mately will choose simply to limit the rights of malpractice victims
or to attack the problems of medical malpractice in a more perspi-
cacious fashion.
